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Driving toward Autonomy? The FBI in the Federal System, 1908-1960
1

Daniel Richman and Sarah Seo

ABSTRACT. This paper explains the growth of the FBI (“Bureau”) in the United States at a time
when criminal justice was largely a local matter by reframing the criminal justice “(eco)system”
in terms of informational economy, rather than jurisdictional authority. It argues that the Bureau
came to occupy a key position in the national law enforcement ecosystem by providing an
informational infrastructure that enabled it to cultivate relationships with local police agencies.
This history offers two insights about the nature of American state and federalism in the
twentieth century. First, the Bureau’s particular strategy for enlarging its capacity beyond its
small size had the ironic effect of trading bureaucratic autonomy for political and operational
support. Second, the strategy impeded the development of the states’ role in criminal law
enforcement and stymied state-state collaborations. The patterns of collaboration that were set by
the 1920s provided the blueprint for the federal government’s anti-crime initiatives throughout
the rest of the century.
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I.

Introduction

Although President Trump’s claims that there is a deep state and that the Federal Bureau
3
of Investigation (FBI) is a central part of it may be incoherent, 2the Bureau has indeed long been
ensconced in the American state and psyche. But how did a small federal agency that began with
minimal and underdefined investigative responsibilities embed itself in the national law
4
enforcement “ecosystem” in the United States where criminal justice was, and still is, a local
matter? In this paper, we explain how this occurred less through jurisdictional expansion and
more by providing an informational infrastructure that allowed the Bureau to cement
relationships with local police departments. We then make two arguments based on this history
of the Bureau’s criminal work during its first half-century (1908-58). First, the way in which the
Bureau enlarged its capacity had the ironic effect of limiting its bureaucratic autonomy, a
dynamic that highlights the conditional nature of American state-building in the twentieth
century and has implications for the Bureau’s position today. Second, the strategy also had
consequences for American federalism, by impeding the development of the states’ role in
criminal law enforcement and retarding state-state collaborations.
The story of how the Bureau constructed the national criminal enforcement architecture
and made itself the keystone has usually been told with reference to notorious episodes that have
captured the national imagination: the Palmer raids, the Red Scare, Dillinger, Nazi saboteurs, and
COINTELPRO and MLK Jr., to name a few. Many of these moments have been linked to the
creation of a “national security state” and the targeting of domestic “subversion,” with J. Edgar
Hoover looming large in most narratives. These histories are not wrong. Presidents from FDR
through at least Nixon turned to the Bureau for investigative assistance and political intelligence.
So too has the Bureau’s domestic security docket expanded in times of real or perceived national
emergencies. And going after Famous Bad Guys has been a strategy for bureaucratic acclaim,
however short-lived.
2

Philip Bump, The Deep State Strikes Back: Former FBI Leaders Rebut Questions About the Russia
Investigation, Wash. Post, May 10, 2019.
3
For narrative ease, we use “Bureau” to refer to the agency variously called the “Division of Investigation,”
the “Bureau of Investigation,” and the “Federal Bureau of Investigation” (from 1934 on).
4
We use “ecosystem” to capture the multiple actors and institutions engaged in policing work, with various
degrees of interaction. And we draw on Patrick Joyce to distinguish a “network” from a “system.” Patrick Joyce,
The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State Since 1800, at 58 (2013) (“A network denotes an
element of openness, drawing on the idea of the lattice or the web. A ‘system’ denotes more what is closed and can
be self-referring or self-regulating.”). We leave to others the more capacious and fraught issue of “criminal justice
system” identification. See Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the Criminal Justice System, 45 Am. J. Crim. L. 55 (2018);
Bernard Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: From Operations Research to Contemporary Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
Perils of Systems Analysis, Past and Present (manuscript 2014).
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Yet these familiar stories do not adequately explain the Bureau’s political staying power
and the historical development of its capabilities in the policing realm. Presidential favor,
national fears, and high-profile takedowns have their limits in a nation where such patronage
presents a double-edged sword, fears come and go, and the supply of notorious criminals is not
always steady. Tooting one’s own horn helps, and the Bureau’s public-relations efforts are
legendary. But legends did not drive the appropriations that the Bureau needed to survive and
thrive during shifting winds. And self-promotion certainly did not strengthen the Bureau’s
informational networks, which depended largely on local departments not keen to be left out of
the limelight.
Scholarship focusing more on statutory, rather than agency, development has followed
the arc of “overfederalization” in which proliferating federal criminal laws broadened the
jurisdiction of federal enforcement agencies that overlapped with traditional spheres of local
5
police power. This literature is of course correct to highlight the impressive number of additions
to the United States Code, many of which criminalized conduct already addressed under state
laws. Yet that literature too often fails to consider operational realities and the very nature of the
criminal enforcement project. Even as its jurisdiction and size increased, the Bureau never had
the capacity, or interest, to intrude at will onto local turf.
A recognition of these on-the-ground, day-to-day realities should push us to think beyond
formal notions about federalism and to consider the workings of the American federal law
enforcement apparatus. How did the federal government justify its involvement in crime control,
and how did the Bureau take part in its anti-crime efforts? More specifically, how did the
Bureau—with limited resources and against a backdrop of serious concerns, particularly from
southern states, about the national government’s expansion—grow and flourish at minimal cost
and disruption to the federal-state relationship? And how did this development shape the Bureau
itself?
To answer these questions, our story focuses not on what the Bureau is remembered for
doing—often the product of its own storytelling—and more on what it actually spent its time
doing during its first half century, from its creation in 1908 to 1960. And it looks beyond the
statistics that Hoover marshaled to demonstrate the Bureau’s effectiveness to how, exactly, the
Bureau pursued its law enforcement mission. Doing so requires attention to the needs of crime
control at the local level as well as the realities of a multi-jurisdictional nation in an increasingly
mobile world.
At the heart of any criminal justice project is the acquisition and use of crime-related
information. Before the twentieth century, police patrol provided both direct procurement of
information by beat officers and derivative procurement through contacts with citizens who had
6
information. But at the turn of the century, especially when mass-produced automobiles gave
5

See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Overfederalization, in 1 Academy for Justice 39 (2017) (citing literature);
Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2009). But see Susan R. Klein &
Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 Emory L.J. 1 (2012).
6
Christopher Thale, The Informal World of Police Patrol, 33 J. Urban Hist. 183 (2007); Raymond B.
Fosdick, American Police Systems (1920); Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, 1,
in 15 Crime & Justice: Modern Policing (1992).
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individuals—and criminals—unprecedented mobility, local law enforcement confronted the
reality that they needed information from outside their jurisdictions, which motivated them—or
at least the most conscientious departments—to seek information-sharing arrangements. But
creating an informational infrastructure proved difficult in a federal system. One possibility was
to create a horizontal network, but the lack of state-to-state cooperation even where
constitutionally mandated (as for fugitives), and the commons problem of state funding for such
a network, made this option close to impossible. The fact that counties, not states, were the real
sites of criminal enforcement didn’t help either.
The other possibility was a federal infrastructure. Around this same period, the federal
government—called on to address crimes with an interstate aspect—was becoming a potential
competitor for the use of this information. Still, local police embraced an informational
infrastructure managed by the Bureau and, in exchange, to contribute information to it. For they
knew that the feds, because of their small size and lack of patrol duties would depend on them
for criminal information to bring their cases. The story of the Bureau from its beginning has been
about its oversight, cultivation, and use of this informational give and take.
The Bureau’s growth thus can be understood only by reframing the criminal justice
ecosystem in terms of informational economy rather than jurisdictional authority. Within this
ecosystem, local police departments first tried to create their own networks to share information,
mainly through the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). But they ultimately
relied on the Bureau to provide a platform to facilitate information exchange. This paper
provides an account of how the Bureau created that platform in two main ways. First, it
translated the new federal criminal statutes, in particular the National Motor Vehicle Theft
(Dyer) Act, into a mandate to assist local agencies. A significant portion of the Bureau’s
caseload during its first fifty years was auto theft cases. This did not mean that the Bureau itself
investigated and prosecuted these cases; rather, its role often amounted to “packaging”
information across jurisdictions and then “gifting” the cases to local departments for prosecution.
Second, the Bureau administered the National Division of Identification and Information, which
essentially served as a centralized clearinghouse for crime-related information for local, state,
and federal enforcement agencies.
The Bureau’s commitment to both projects, far from intruding on local domains, allowed
police departments to retain considerable independence from state governments even as the new
(auto)mobility limited their reach. Its service mission had implications on the Bureau’s
“autonomy” as well. While the Bureau grew to become an important and powerful federal
agency, its history suggests a legitimacy rooted in local support—a history that continues to have
implications for today.
The paper begins in Part II with the construction of the national law enforcement
ecosystem in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Part III then details how this
infrastructure for information sharing laid the foundation for FDR’s war on crime in the 1930s
and continued to provide the blueprint for the federal government’s anti-crime initiatives
throughout the twentieth century. Finally, Part IV explores the implications of our story, first for

4
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7

the Bureau’s “autonomy” during its first half-century and perhaps far beyond, and second for
horizontal federalism in the policing context.
II.

From Fragmentation toward Network

Given that crime and punishment are traditionally local matters, why in the early
twentieth century did Congress enact a slew of federal criminal laws, including laws that
overlapped with state criminal laws? And how did the Bureau come to occupy a prominent
position in the national law enforcement ecosystem that emerged?
This section examines how the Bureau found its role within a legislative framework
created by a Congress whose very embrace of criminal justice localism led it to create new
federal offenses structured to aid local departments and respect local sensibilities. Crucial to this
story are the unprecedented changes in mobility that the mass production of cars introduced in
American society, forcing adaptations to traditional law enforcement arrangements. Through
public and private alliances, the Bureau earned a place for itself in the criminal justice ecosystem
by translating its mandate to enforce federal laws into a mandate to serve local law enforcement.
A. Transitions in an Automotive Society
Before the twentieth century, the federal government lacked a general criminal
investigative force. It did not have many criminal laws either. In the nineteenth century, federal
authorities prosecuted crimes listed in the US Constitution (piracy, counterfeiting, treason, and
felonies committed on the high seas), perjury and bribery committed in connection with federal
cases, extortion of federal officers, thefts of federal property, arson on federal vessels, and
revenue crimes. Even after the Civil War, when Congress slightly expanded the national
government’s criminal docket with statutes protecting civil rights and regulating the mails, the
new Department of Justice (DOJ) and its US Attorneys’ offices relied on private detectives or
8
borrowed Secret Service agents from the Treasury Department.
Other than the crimes that fell within the federal government’s strictly delineated
9
jurisdiction, the rest of police regulation and enforcement occurred at the local level. It is true
that criminal enforcement’s reliance on closely held information generally tends to pull authority
10
down to the lowest levels even in the most centralized policing regimes. But Americans also
held fast to local governance as a matter of principle (and racialized preference). Centralized
police forces were anathema, and federal criminal interventions politically fraught, especially in
7

For recent allusions to the Bureau’s autonomy, see, e.g., Patrick S. Roberts, How Security Agencies Control
Change: Executive Power and the Quest for Autonomy in the FBI and CIA, Public Organization Review (June
2009); Beverly Gage, Deep Throat, Watergate, & the Bureaucratic Politics of the FBI, 24 J. Policy Hist. 157, 159-60
(2012) (on FBI’s “autonomy” under Hoover).
8

See Daniel C. Richman, Kate Stith & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes (2d ed. 2019).

9

“Police” in this context is used in the broad sense, referring to regulations, including criminal laws,
enacted for the benefit of the public welfare. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the
Foundations of American Government (2005).
10
See Otwin Marenin, Police Performance and State Rule: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of
Coercion, 18 Comparative Politics 101,107- 09 (1985) (on the “work of policing”).
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11

the South, where concern that the feds would undermine Jim Crow ran deep. This hostility
extended even to the state level. According to one study, in 1905, only five states had some form
12
13
of state police. Only by the end of the 1930s did all the states establish their own forces.
As a result, crime control in the United States had two distinct characteristics: it was a
local matter and often prosecuted privately. Victims—either the individuals themselves or their
insurance companies—investigated and pursued charges against perpetrators, who often could
not flee very far before the advent of motorized vehicles and better roads. Certainly, train travel
enabled jurisdiction skipping, but at a frequency and scale that hired investigators could manage.
It also helped that trains followed a schedule set in advance.
Beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century, both aspects of crime
control—local and private enforcement—were changing. By the 1880s, all of the major US cities
had established municipal police forces that were slowly but increasingly focusing on crime
14
prevention. Rather than waiting for a privately sworn arrest warrant or for a crime to unfold in
their presence before taking action, these officials sought to proactively stop criminals before
they could commit their misdeeds. Such preventive policing required knowledge not just of illicit
plans, but also of potential criminals, which, in turn, depended on knowledge of their identities
and histories.15 At the same time, Americans’ increased mobility, aided first by locomotive trains
and then mass-produced cars, made it difficult for local police departments to keep track of
habitual offenders. (Auto)mobility also expanded the scope of criminal activities, and towns and
16
cities throughout the country were experiencing the limits of local law enforcement. Train
travel made it increasingly possible, for instance, for residents of a dry locale to buy alcohol from

11
Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice,
and Civil Rights, 1866–1876 (2005); Robert M. Goldman, A Free Ballot and a Fair Count: The Department of
Justice and the Enforcement of Voting Rights in the South, 1877–1893 (2001); Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the
Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice in Northern Mississippi, 1870-90, 53 J. Southern Hist. 421 (1987);
Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth
Century America, 26 L. & Hist. Rev. 1 (2008); Scott C. James & Brian L. Lawson, “The Political Economy of
Voting Rights Enforcement in America’s Gilded Age: Electoral College Competition, Partisan Commitment, and the
Federal Election Law,” 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 115 (1999); Wilbur R. Miller, The Revenue: Federal Law
Enforcement in the Mountain South, 1870-1900, 55 J. South. Hist. 195 (1989); Jonathan Obert, A Fragmented
Force, The Evolution of Federal Law Enforcement in the United States, 1870-1900, 29 J. Policy Hist. 640 (2017).
12

This story is told more fully in Sarah Seo, Policing the Open Road 78 (2019).

13
Even then, nearly all of them did so to enforce traffic and highway safety laws and not to perform general
police functions. For example, Iowa finally established the “Iowa Highway Safety Patrol” only in 1935 after it
identified reckless driving as “Public Enemy Number One.” The states did not want their own centralized police
forces or even administrative hierarchies that subsumed local forces. When necessity finally compelled them, many
states made sure not to confer general police powers to their highway patrollers.
14

John A. Fairlie, Police Administration, 16 Pol. Sci. Quarterly 1, 7-8 (1901); Raymond B. Fosdick,
American Police Systems, 58-117 (1920); Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, 1,
in 15 Crime & Justice: Modern Policing (1992).
15

See Sankar diss., 125-35.
See Erik Larson, Devil in the White City: Murder, Magic, and Madness at the Fair That Changed
America (2004).
16

6
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a neighboring wet jurisdiction, prompting reformers to try to impose prohibition at the state
17
level.
The automotive revolution in transportation that took off around 1910—Henry Ford
perfected the Model T’s moving assembly line in 1914—magnified the challenges to law
18
enforcement. From 1895 to 1929, the number of cars shot up from just 4 (that is, in the single
digits) to more than 23 million. This automobile boom contributed to an explosion of crime as
the getaway became indispensable for the commission of age-old crimes like bank robberies,
kidnapping, and murder. Cars also created a new crime: auto theft. The prominent criminal law
scholar Jerome Hall may have found it “quite extraordinary that theft of automobiles should be
of particular importance,” but he recognized that the phenomenon “loom[ed] up in unique
19
importance.” Striking the same note, a congressman from Missouri declared in 1919 that there
was “no class of criminal enjoying more lucrative gain as a reward for their industry than the
20
automobile thieves of the country.” Although mass production made cars much more
affordable to a wider class of consumers, they were still among the most valuable assets for the
average family. Motor cars were expensive enough and sufficiently necessary in many parts of
the country to support a thriving market for secondhand cars and parts. Standardized cars with
standardized parts facilitated this secondary market, as did the automobile manufacturers’
disinclination to develop locking devices and ways of identifying cars and confirming
ownership.
Crossing county, state, and even national boundaries became more frequent, and for
some, a daily passage from home to work and back. Sophisticated auto theft rings took
advantage of the variegated landscape in a federal system of government. They would steal cars
21
in one state and sell them in another where there was no record of the thefts. Operations near
the Mexican or Canadian border were especially cunning. During National Prohibition, for
example, bootleggers could steal a car in New York, drive to Canada, and sell it there. They
could use the proceeds of the sale to purchase liquor in Canada, then steal another car, and
transport the illicit goods back to the States, where they could sell the alcohol and the stolen car
22
and make a tidy profit. A more recreational pattern, decried in California, was the “great spring
drive,” in which thieves stole “the cars they intend to drive East with the coming of the first
23
warm weather” and sold them when they got there.

17

See Richard Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth.

18

See Seo, Policing the Open Road.

19
Jerome Hall, Theft, Law, and Society, 230-31 (1935); see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413
(1957) (citing Hall when interpreting what “stolen” means under the Dyer Act).
20

C.R. House 5474.

21
As Hoover reported in 1926, “We have bands of automobile thieves who steal machines in one state and
pass them over to another band in another state to sell them.” 1926 Proceeding, in Proceedings of the Annual
Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1926-1930, vol. 5 (New York, 1971), 56.
22

Sauter, The Origin, 5.

23
“Plan to Stop Car Stealing: Auto Club Considering Several Recommendations,” L.A. Times, Feb. 29,
1920, at VI1 (noting that “[l]enient jail sentences” “make auto thieving a pastime here”).
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In 1926, the Chicago Daily Tribune noted these changes when observing that “[t]oday
crime is a national affair, run on interstate lines, made so by the railroads and the automobile,
24
principally the latter.” But not too long ago, it reminded readers, crime had been “a local
25
affair,” when criminals “operated locally and disposed of their loot locally.” J. Edgar Hoover
likewise reminisced in 1925 (although not from much personal experience):
In times past (and not so far distant past) crime or the criminal was a
more or less local issue. Our local or neighborhood criminal was known,
his haunts could be watched, his associates shadowed, the method and
nature of the crime often bore within itself the recognizable identity of
the criminal. He could often be captured on the scene of the crime, the
fastest means of locomotion being either human or equine. Then, too, his
means of travel, which were limited, could be traced with comparative
ease. Should he escape to some other community, the danger of his
capture was still imminent. Every stranger was a marked man, every
26
newcomer aroused suspicion.
Notwithstanding these unprecedented law enforcement challenges, crime control
remained mostly local during the automobile’s early years. Even in the first decades of the
twentieth century, private groups took on the lion’s share of criminal investigations. When a
vehicle was stolen, hapless owners would contact local authorities. But they also posted a reward
for the recovery of their cars or, if they had auto theft insurance, had their insurers post it.
Citizens and businesses soon came together in common cause. As Congressman Newman of
Missouri observed, “[s]o frightful has this menace [auto theft] become that automobile clubs and
automobile protective associations have been formed, and they have been joined by chambers of
commerce and commercial clubs all over the country in an effort to stamp out this lawless
27
industry.”
During this period of transition, citizens and private associations, and especially state and
local governments, were quickly discovering their limits in a federalist system. How were law
officers whose authority covered only a single jurisdiction to pursue bootleggers, highway
robbers, and other fugitives? The mobility of crime also gave rise to the need to share
information about runaways, fugitives, arrestees, prisoners, and the recently released. As a New
York City police commissioner explained, a fugitive from the state who fled to Chicago to
commit more crimes and was there arrested, convicted, and sentenced could, upon release, return
to New York unrecognized and with New York police unaware that the fugitive had spent time

24

“The Interstate Commerce of Crime,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 17, 1926.

25

Id.

26

1925 Proceeding, in Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, 1921-1925, vol. 4 (New York, 1971), 49. See also 1926 Proceeding, in Proceedings of the Annual
Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1926-1930, vol. 5 (New York, 1971), 56 (“Crime
of yesterday, accordingly, was an entirely local matter—a Main street affair.”).
27

C.R. House 5474.

8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415103

28

in a Chicago prison in the first place. Other chiefs similarly observed that “professional thieves
are constantly moving from one locality to another, one city to another, one State to another.
These professionals make circuits and become national characters, traveling and depredating
29
here, there, and everywhere.” Some sort of informational network linking local departments
was needed, but jurisdictional limits, fears of centralization, and the challenges of collective
action were potent impediments.
B. Rudimentary Structures Emerge
These social changes prompted at least two efforts toward the creation of a national
network. The first came from local police leaders themselves, and the second from the US
Justice Department. But the country was not yet ready to set aside its ideological opposition to a
national police force. As a result, law enforcement adaptations during the years straddling the
turn of the century reflected Martha Derthick’s observation that Americans have “moved
30
paradoxically both to centralize and decentralize.” They also reflected what Gary Gerstle calls
the “improvisational” nature of America’s state-building in response to the “governing
31
challenges of the industrial age.”
In 1893, forty-seven progressive police chiefs—leaders of significant local
forces—gathered in Chicago to form the National Chiefs of Police Union, with the goal of
32
improving “the detection and prevention of crime in the United States.” As its president
explained in 1895, the organization arose from the “constant telegraphic correspondence” among
“the police departments of the larger cities,” whose leaders recognized that “the effectiveness of
33
one department depends upon the police system of other cities.” In an increasingly mobile
world, they realized, local knowledge was woefully inadequate and stymied preventive policing.
One of the Union’s first agenda items was to create “the National Police Bureau” for “the
34
practical exchange of ideas and information pertaining to police business.” In the beginning,
that information focused on the identities of perpetrators based on the Bertillon system,
developed in the 1880s and relying on measurements from head to toe “based on the principle
35
that no two adult creatures are alike.” By the early 1900s, the organization, renamed the
28

1924 Congressional hearing, 6.

29
A Bill for the Creation of a National Bureau of Criminal Identification, in Proceedings of the Annual
Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1893-1905, vol. 1 (New York, 1971), 20.
30

Martha Derthick, Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism 11 (2001).

31
Gary Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the
Present 93 (2015).
32

“Chiefs of Police Coming,” The Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1895. Police leaders gathered for the first National
Police Conference and called for a national criminal identification system in 1871. See Sankar diss., 124-125. But
momentum did not gather until 1893. See id. at 201.
33
1895 Proceedings, in Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, 1893-1905, vol. 1 (New York, 1971), 9.
34

“Chiefs of Police Coming.”

35

1902 Proceedings, 18.
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International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)—in recognition of the need to communicate
36
with police agencies in foreign countries as well—set up a “bureau of criminal identification.”
This exchange received “a lot of fingerprints,” which proved even more reliable than the
Bertillon system.
But the dues—about $25 a year—gathered from the 200 participating departments were
37
insufficient to pay for the distribution of that information. Also, without a critical mass of
participating police departments or a central database available to law enforcement throughout
the country, the effectiveness of the IACP’s bureau was limited. So in 1901, the IACP looked to
the federal government to solve the coordination problem and drafted a bill for Congress to
establish “a National Bureau of Criminal Identification in connection with the Department of
38
Justice.” The bill provided for the creation of a DOJ division “where shall be collected and
filed, so far as may be practicable for record and report, plates, photographs, outline pictures,
descriptions, information, and measurements of all persons who have been or may be convicted
and imprisoned” for violating any laws of the United States as well as its “several States and
39
Territories, or the [] municipalities thereof.” To convince Congress to pay for the new division,
the IACP pledged that “the Government would receive a full reciprocal amount of aid and
40
information” on federal crimes from local departments. “The whole arrangement,” it
envisioned, “would constitute one great web which the malefactor could not elude, and bring the
authorities everywhere, Government and State, into full sympathy and co-operation, the
41
Government being amply repaid for the small expenditure.”
42

Congress, however, needed more persuading. To be sure, many congressmen supported
the idea. The House Judiciary Committee reported favorably on the bill; it lifted phrases directly
from the IACP’s bill to conclude that not only would the creation of “one great web which the
malefactor could not elude” benefit the states, but that the federal government could also be
43
“amply repaid for the small expenditure.” Indeed, the report pointed out that with identification
information, police authorities throughout the country could help find military deserters.
Moreover, the heads of the Secret Service, the Post Office, and the federal penitentiaries all gave

36

1924 Congressional hearing, 33.

37

Id. at 7, 21, 24, 67.

38

1902 IACP Proceedings, at 14; see also 35 Cong. Rec. 5870 (May 23, 1902) (H. R. 100068). See also
Letter from Richard Sylvester, Mayor and Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Department, Urging
Legislation Looking to the Establishment in Washington City of a Bureau to be Known as the National Bureau of
Criminal Identification, to Senator George G. Vest (December 13, 1900), Document No. 43, 56th Congress 2d
Session.
39

Id. at 15.

40

Id. at 19.

41

Id.

42

See Mary M. Stolberg, Policing the Twilight Zone: Federalizing Crime Fighting during the New Deal, 7
J. of Policy Hist. 393, 395-396 (1995), on opposition to Bureau creation.
43
Mr. Jenkins, Committee on the Judiciary, Report on National Bureau of Criminal Identification, Report
No. 429, 57th Congress, 1st Session (February 7, 1902), 3.
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“favorable and unqualified indorsement [sic] ” because such a national bureau would place them
44
“in closer touch with the police authorities, and a thorough cooperation [would] follow.”
But those in opposition prevailed. The Senate Judiciary Committee “reported adversely”
45
on the bill, which was thereafter “postponed indefinitely.” Without a copy of its report, the
precise reasons for the committee’s conclusion are unknown. But the House’s report provides
some clues. It maintained, defensively, that it was “not proposed that the bureau shall be a
46
detective agency.” A federal agency with the authority to compile and distribute criminal
identification information would, some feared, come too close to a national police force, an
abomination to Americans. And so for another two decades, the proposal would languish, and
the IACP would continue to maintain its own voluntary network of information sharing.
Even as the grand informational infrastructure plans of those responsible for most
criminal enforcement in the country were inching along, the modest informational needs of the
federal Justice Department—delegated with the prosecution of a relatively narrow range of cases
47
that mostly came from the Treasury and Post Office —increasingly required executive attention.
Before 1908, DOJ borrowed Secret Service agents from Treasury to pursue sundry investigations
48
into violations of the internal revenue, post office, and land laws. In 1907, Attorney General
Charles Bonaparte (the Emperor’s grand-nephew) called on Congress to remedy this “anomaly”
49
and establish a “permanent detective force.”
But Congress—some of whose members were implicated in corrupt schemes that DOJ
50
was investigating (an investigation unsurprisingly alleged to be politically motivated) —balked
at the proposal. As several of its members pointed out, the United States never had a general
police system that spied on its citizens because it was antithetical to American freedom.51 Not
only did Congress reject Bonaparte’s proposal, but so strong was its fear of a political police
force that it also moved to preclude the Department’s use of Secret Service agents. US Attorney
for the Southern District of New York Henry Stimson worried that this move could destroy the
52
“fighting power of his office.” After Congress adjourned for the summer, Bonaparte,

44

Id.

45
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46
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47
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dissertation, Univ. of New Hamp. 1981) (maintaining that “at no time” did congressional critics “advance their
proposals to protect themselves from possible criminal investigation”).
51
52

Lowenthal, 3-4.
Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 377.

11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415103

encouraged by President Theodore Roosevelt, reached into DOJ funds and quietly created an
53
investigative unit.
The following year, in 1909, Congress finally authorized the creation of the Bureau of
Investigation, after its members were shamed for opposing a federal law enforcement agency in
the middle of an unfolding congressional scandal.54 The Bureau was ushered into formal
existence with promises that it would not become a spy force and would simply support the
rather narrow criminal mission of the Justice Department. As Bonaparte had told Congress, “the
detective force which minds its own business, and attends to that, and does nothing else, is more
55
effective as a means of suppressing crime than one which is used for any extraneous purpose.”
The new Attorney General, George W. Wickersham, heralded the agency’s arrival with a
front-page announcement of coordinated raids on a group of fraud-ridden stockbrokers based on
56
the “new” bureau’s wiretap-based investigation. Yet, given that the Bureau lacked arrest
powers, and with the real manpower for the arrests coming from the Secret Service, the Bureau’s
ancillary status could not have been clearer.
C. Substantive Criminal Laws and Enforcement Challenges
Local police departments’ interest in sharing information would, in time, find a champion
and platform in the new Bureau. It would never have assumed this role, however, had not a spate
of federal criminal enactments, also sparked by the new mobility, given it enforcement
responsibilities peculiarly suited to forging a close relationship with departments around the
country. The new substantive laws offered a conceptual, federal structure for information flow
and enforcement over jurisdictional divides. Given the peculiar genealogies of each legislative
foray, and legislators’ lack of thought to enforcement issues, we hesitate to attribute any grand
scheming on the part of any political or bureaucratic actors. The ebb and flow of some
enforcement priorities, however, and the mutual benefits offered by others, shaped the Bureau
and its relationship with its ecosystem.
First, we will explore the new federal statutes, with particular attention to the Dyer Act,
as it was the one that most strengthened the new federal network. Then we will set the stage for
the Dyer Act enforcement story by showing the disruptive or merely episodic effects of other
statutory regimes in action.
i.

New Statutory Forays

In 1910, Congress passed the Mann Act, which criminalized the interstate transportation
57
of any “woman or girl” for “prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.” In
53

Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Year 1909, at 8-10 (1909); see also
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54
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58

1914, it passed the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act. Following the Mann Act, by analogizing
motor vehicles to women, in 1919, Congress enacted the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (the
59
Dyer Act), which criminalized the interstate transportation of stolen vehicles. That same year,
the nation ratified the Eighteenth Amendment to end the shipment of alcohol across state lines;
the next year, in 1920, Congress enacted the Volstead Act, which put National Prohibition into
60
effect.
These new laws stretched long-established bounds of federalism by involving the
national government in conventionally local matters. They also showed how the notions of racial
threat that generally reinforced hostility to federal power could be deployed to counsel just such
authority, so long as it would be mediated by local officials. A febrile mix of “anxiety over
young women in urban areas without the protection of fathers or brothers” and “nativist concerns
over shifting patterns of immigration and its effect on prostitution” propelled the Mann Act into
61
law. The Harrison Act, though ostensibly required by a treaty obligation, was intended “mainly
62
to aid the states in combatting a local police problem which had gotten somewhat out of hand.”
To get the critical support of the Southern Democrats who championed local autonomy in service
of white supremacy, State Department officials strategically (and disingenuously) stressed how
63
cocaine would peculiarly affect African-Americans and thus pose a special threat to whites.
Key to the support of Prohibition in the South was its framing by evangelicals as “the solution to
64
black savagery.” Conversely, a long effort by the NAACP to get anti-lynching legislation,
65
while succeeding in the House in 1922, thereafter died in the Senate. That such a law would
have been little enforced during a period when existing criminal civil rights statutes that easily
66
covered the state-facilitated murders at the heart of the anti-lynching bill went unused until
67
68
1940 (and still often ended in acquittals ) only highlights Southern antipathy to the measure.
58
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Others have amply explored the political mobilization stories behind the Mann Act and
69
Prohibition. But the backstory to the Dyer Act in particular illustrates the important role of
private economic interests in criminal statutory development. In the political economy of the
period, the energy of these interests perhaps compensated for the lack of racial animus powering
this federal intervention. Moreover, because the Dyer Act responded to material changes that the
state writ large could not ignore, this history suggests that some centralization may have been
inevitable, even if its specific contours were still open for negotiation.
Mass-produced cars appeared on Main Streets and interstate highways just as progressive
police chiefs were beginning to coordinate their activities. But the decentralized organization of
law enforcement was ill-suited to pursue automobiles that enabled motorists to flee on a
moment’s notice. In any case, city or county governments were reluctant to spend money
enlarging their police departments to go hunting for criminals who might not fall entirely within
their purview. It also did not make sense for municipalities to spend more money as long as the
pursuit and prosecution of crime was largely a private matter.
Indeed, it was insurance companies at the front lines of fighting auto theft. Their strategy
was to post reward notices within a certain geographic range, usually within a radius of 150
70
miles or so from the point of theft, since early cars on bad roads could travel only so far. By
1912, a group of insurers decided to economize their efforts by forming the American Protective
and Information Bureau (APIB), which served as an information clearinghouse and circulated a
71
single report for all the stolen vehicles they insured.
The APIB was one of those national associations that, as historian Brian Balogh explains,
soon came to “overlay” the federal structure, “thickening the opportunities for intercourse”
72
beyond the local or regional and “ultimately changing the very shape of federalism.” In 1918,
APIB manager E. L. Rickards and Michael Doyle, director of the American Automobile
Insurance Company in St. Louis, Missouri, brainstormed the idea of a national law criminalizing
the transportation of stolen vehicles in interstate traffic, believing that “Federal level
73
involvement” would make a difference in combating the problem. Conveniently, Doyle knew
21, 1942, that “many lynchings, upon investigation, would prove to involve violations of existing federal statutes”
Frank Coleman, Freedom from Fear on the Home Front, 29 Iowa L. R. 415, 425 (1944); see John T. Elliff, The
United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 1937-1962, Harvard Gov, Ph.D. dissertation, 93-111
(1967) (on Civil Rights Section’s 1940 reconsideration of existing statutory authority to prosecute civil rights
crimes).
68
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his congressman, Leonidas Dyer. The following year in 1919, Dyer introduced H.R. 9203 “to
punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce,” which
74
ultimately became the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, or the Dyer Act.
The House’s discussion of the bill centered on Representative Reavis’s question: “How
75
can a Federal law punish a man for stealing an automobile?” After all, theft was already
criminalized under local laws. The IACP, unsure whether Congress had the power to criminalize
76
auto theft, instead suggested that the solution might be for all states to enact such legislation.
“Uniform acts” were regularly bandied about during this period as a partial solution to interstate
problems.
But in the era of the Mann Act and National Prohibition—within three weeks of the
House’s debate, Congress would pass the Volstead Act to enforce the Eighteenth
Amendment—it did not take much to convince most national legislators that the federal
77
government had the authority to criminalize the transport of stolen cars across state lines. One
congressman argued by analogy that “[i]f the transportation of a woman from one State to
another, by means of an automobile, for prostitution, constitutes interstate commerce, then how
can it be argued, with any show of color, that the driving of a stolen automobile from one State
78
to another for profit is not interstate commerce?” Several of his colleagues also pointed out that
79
the “favorite place for such thefts is near a State line.” Dyer maintained that auto thefts were
“particularly” common in the “cities of the Middle West”—especially in his home state
80
Missouri—and that “State laws upon the subject have been inadequate to meet the evil.” Chief
Justice Taft would repeat these arguments in 1924 to uphold the Dyer Act, writing that “[t]he
quick passage of the machines”—as cars were often called then—“into another state helps to
conceal the trail of the thieves, gets the stolen property into another police jurisdiction and
facilitates the finding of a safe place in which to dispose of the booty at a good price. This is a
81
gross misuse of interstate commerce.”
Dyer and Newton also argued that the new bill comfortably fell within interstate
commerce in a more traditional sense by invoking the interests of the insurance industry. In the
74
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76
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77
See C.R. House 5471 (“The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the theft of
automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another State can not [sic] be questioned, in view of laws of
similar nature heretofore enacted by Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States touching
same.”).
78

C.R. House 5476.

79

C.R. Senate 6433; see also C.R. House 5474.

80

C.R. House 5470, 5471.

81
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 438-439 (1924). See also Kelly v. United States, 277 Fed. 405
(4th Cir. 1921); Whitaker v. Hitt, 285 Fed. 797 (D.C. Cir. 1922); Katz v. United States, 281 Fed. 129 (6th Cir.
1922); United States v. Winkler, 299 Fed. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1924); Hughes v. United States, 4 F. 2d 387 (8th Cir.
1925).

15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415103

82

face of a high risk of loss, “almost every owner in the land [held] a larceny policy.” But this
was precisely the reason why providing insurance against auto theft proved to be a losing
business proposition. “One of the reasons why this legislation is needed so badly,” Dyer pointed
out, was because “automobile theft insurance has advanced in the past year over 100 per cent on
83
cars costing from $500 to $900.” The economics of this situation especially affected ordinary
citizens, for “cheaper cars are stolen,” making it “almost impossible for the owners of these
84
cheaper cars to obtain at any rate automobile theft insurance.” Given the recent precedents of
the Mann Act and the Volstead Act, as well as the broad reach of auto theft on the material lives
of many citizens, it took just one month for Dyer’s bill to become law, on October 29, 1919.
ii.

The Enforcement Challenge

Criminal laws, however, don’t enforce themselves. To enforce the new statutes, Congress
appropriated more money to federal agencies, particularly the Justice Department. But it was
never enough, leaving DOJ and its Bureau with insufficient manpower to achieve its new
assignments. So they relied on the volunteerism of citizens and private organizations as well as
collaborations with state and local agencies—collaborations that rendered the feds dependent on
the support of these non-federal entities. In Part III, we will show how what Brian Balogh calls
the “local, state, voluntary, and private-sector filters that limited federal autonomy” shaped the
Bureau’s response to the Dyer Act and, in turn, strengthened the emerging federally mediated
85
network. First, however, we put the Dyer Act story in context and highlight the allure of that
enforcement project, by comparing other contemporaneous collaborative efforts and their
institutional effects.
The role of the American Protective League (APL) volunteers in reporting subversive
activities and enforcing alien registration during World War I is well known, in large part
86
because of their abuses. Their “slacker raids” resulted in the detention of tens of thousands of
87
draft-age citizens, often at bayonet point. President Woodrow Wilson had reservations about
the APL’s involvement, but his attorney general persuaded him “that the assistance of APL
volunteers was the only way the Bureau could meet the rush of war-time work without adding
82
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83
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88

unduly to the permanent federal bureaucracy.” This was so even with soaring congressional
89
appropriations from 1916 to 1919.
Historian Lisa McGirr has also documented how a volunteer army, which included the
Ku Klux Klan, enforced Prohibition because many police departments refused to do so and
Prohibition agents (at first, under the Treasury Department) proved inadequate to the task. This
was most frustrating to a public keeping an eye on unprecedented levels of federal spending to
build the Prohibition enforcement apparatus. Even with an agency more than four times the size
90
of the Bureau of Investigation, the head of the Prohibition Bureau declared that his agents could
fulfill their task only with “the closest cooperation between the Federal officers and all other
91
law-enforcing officers—State, county, and municipal.”
92

Unfortunately, cooperation was generally not forthcoming. So President Coolidge tried
out a constitutional argument that the Eighteenth Amendment put “a concurrent duty on the
93
States.” The Commissioner of Prohibition likewise insisted that there was “no doubt” that states
were required “to exercise in their appropriate sphere of action the full police powers of the
94
State, in order to properly discharge their obligations under the Eighteenth Amendment.” But
many states and local governments ignored these claims, most notably in Manhattan. New York
City police, many from ethnic, working-class communities that viewed Prohibition as an
indictment against their way of life, did not care to assist the feds, nor were they inclined to obey
95
the law themselves. Even after the Anti-Saloon League, a voluntarist organization, successfully
lobbied for the 1921 Mullan-Gage Enforcement Law, which squarely obliged the police to
96
participate in the Prohibition project, many police officers still dragged their feet or took bribes.
Their lackadaisical attitude frustrated the drys, while their corruption enraged the entire citizenry,
with the wets leading the charge that the threat to the rule of law was not worth the noble
97
experiment. It did not help matters that many officers of the Bureau of Prohibition were
susceptible to bribery as well.
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98

Without state and local participation, Prohibition was doomed to failure. The New York
99
example foreshadowed what might happen throughout the country. In 1922, New Yorkers
voted out Governor Nathan Miller, who had given them the Mullan-Gage Law, and replaced him
100
with Al Smith, a committed “wet.” The new governor quickly won the repeal of the state’s
Prohibition enforcement statute, describing the Eighteenth Amendment as “not a command but
101
an option.”
Meanwhile, the Bureau quietly celebrated its distance from the “Great Experiment.” Any
significant involvement with such a controversial and corrupting project would have stymied the
fledgling agency, as it did for the Prohibition Bureau. The Bureau of Investigation’s role, the
Wickersham Commission would report, was limited to “apprehending fugitives, who have
violated the prohibition laws, and in following up interstate vehicle thefts, and impersonations of
102
prohibition officers.” One gets the sense that the Bureau’s efforts to widely circulate materials
about what enforcement responsibilities it had during Prohibition was primarily to highlight the
103
responsibilities it did not have.

While the enforcement of Prohibition offered an example of what not to do, the Bureau’s
Mann Act work provided a counterexample of a fruitful relationship with non-federal partners.
The act’s passage in 1910 put “white slavery” at the top of the Bureau’s priorities and,
importantly, justified more funds for the fledgling agency. The Bureau was, after all, the only
federal police agency available to go after morals violations that did not go through the mails and
that lacked a fiscal dimension. In early 1911, Attorney General Wickersham and Bureau Chief
Stanley Finch assured the House Committee on Appropriations that the sensational reports about
white slave trafficking were indeed true and that the Bureau was “endeavoring to make a very
104
comprehensive investigation and enforcement” of the Mann Act. Doing so, they went on to
claim, “has cost [the Bureau] a very large amount of money,” and to continue their work, they
98
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105

argued, “we must have more money … and a somewhat bigger force.” Requests for more
funding, however, proved more persuasive when they came from local and citizen groups, rather
than federal bureaucrats. Later in the same year, after Wickersham reported that the Bureau had
run out of funds allocated to Mann Act investigations, Finch reached out to morals reformers to
lobby Congress for more money. The following letter-writing campaign prompted Congress to
106
earmark an extra $50,000 for white slavery cases, increased by another $200,000 in 1913.
But these infusions of money were still insignificant, and the Bureau relied on
107
public-private partnerships and volunteerism. After Finch became the special commissioner of
108
the Mann Act, he smartly established a vast network of local, part-time, and minimally
109
compensated white-slave officers, usually local lawyers. Together, they obtained more than
110
300 convictions between September 1912 and September 1913 alone.
Support from police and communities also powerfully rebutted claims that the federal
government was meddling in a presumptively local matter. An early Supreme Court challenge to
the Mann Act “condemn[ed the Act] as a subterfuge and an attempt to interfere with the police
111
power of the states to regulate the morals of their citizens,” “an invasion of the reserved
112
powers of the states.” But the police themselves saw no troubling intrusion, just an opportunity
for collaboration. At the 1913 IACP convention, President Richard H. Sylvester touted the
extensive cooperation between the Bureau and locals. Police chiefs brought information about
houses of “ill-repute” to Finch’s attention, then the feds took action. He noted that in
Washington, DC, his own jurisdiction, “several” cases had been “disposed of by the United
113
States authorities and the police have been foremost in bringing them to the front.”
Scholars have pointed to the Mann Act, as well as the Volstead Act, as turning points in
114
the federalization of law enforcement. Yet one should avoid conflating legislation with
enforcement. In fact, the enforcement of these new laws actually highlights federal dependency.
Although support from citizens was crucial when Bureau officials went before Congress to
justify its existence and request more funds, a perennially resource-strapped federal agency paid
105
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a price when it came to the control of its agenda. Without a sufficient force of its own, Finch’s
team depended on whatever information they received about potential Mann Act violations.
Notwithstanding the Bureau’s desire to focus on commercial prostitution and to avoid policing
115
morals, the “thousands of letters from neighbors, wives, husbands, fathers, and busybodies
116
complaining of sexual irregularities” necessarily determined the Bureau’s caseload. Women
seeking redress against lovers and husbands who spurned them, parents wanting to control
daughters, and judgmental neighbors all saw the Mann Act as their tool. Given the drumbeat of
these civilian complaints and calls from reformers demanding prosecution, it is not surprising
that Mann Act cases skewed toward immoral behavior and less toward interstate prostitution
117
rings that were harder to investigate.
Dependence on others for information deprived the Bureau of agenda control, but the
corollary was support for that agenda and for the Bureau itself. When this collaboration was not
forthcoming—as Prohibition authorities discovered with liquor cases—no (realistically
conceivable) amount of federal funding could have supported the agencies tasked with
enforcement. Neither could the passions of a discrete contingent of crusaders sustain the
Bureau’s growth over a longer period. Once the white-slavery scare dissipated, the Bureau’s
118
appropriations stagnated.
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The same patterns held during the Red Scare. The Armistice put an end to the Bureau’s
119
reliance on the APL and was about to lead to a considerable reduction in force when a series of
bombing attempts targeted administration officials, including the new Attorney General Palmer.
120
Notwithstanding the resulting hysteria, much of it manufactured, the Red Scare actually
demonstrates the double-edged nature of the Bureau’s security work. On one hand, such work
did enlarge its sphere; helping the war effort and going after radicals after World War I made the
Bureau seem indispensable to key national goals.
On the other hand, the Bureau would regularly find that political commitment to its
121
national-security portfolio ebbed and flowed. While the Bureau’s readiness to take on
politically sensitive assignments from the White House ensured presidential support (and would
122
always be at odds with Hoover-centric stories of bureaucratic autonomy ), such responsiveness
to explicit or implicit signals from its political masters did not provide a sustainable business
123
model. Indeed, the Bureau remained small throughout the Red Scare—which, strictly speaking
was more a project of Attorney General, and presidential hopeful, Palmer than the ailing
124
President Wilson. From 1919 to 1920, staff at headquarters numbered only thirty-one, and
125
only sixty-one special agents worked in the field full-time on radical activities. Given their
paltry numbers, they had to rely on local police forces in its many raids on strikers, anarchists,
126
and communists. By Fall of 1920, Republican President-elect Harding would declare that “too
127
128
much has been said about Bolshevism in America,” and budget strings were tightened.
119
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Given the fickleness of political winds and congressional ambivalence about the Bureau’s work,
129
especially during the civil-liberties backlash after the excesses of the slacker raids, the
Bureau’s longevity—and appropriations—would have to be based on a steadier stream of work
that not only mattered to everyday life for ordinary citizens but also transcended politics du jour.
130

The institutional legitimacy of federal law enforcement drew on the mandate to enforce
federal criminal laws. Yet this was also a period when, as historian Kimberly S. Johnson relates,
efforts “to extend the reach of the national government within a disjointed, weak, and fragmented
political system” required “administrative structures that would also … reflect Congress’s
localist orientation, its limited capacity for oversight, and the national bureaucracy’s limited
131
ability to implement policy on its own.” In the policing context, the local, state, voluntary, and
private-sector filter through which federal efforts had to be refracted distorted federal priorities,
save where the feds fully internalized service to others into their own work. The Dyer Act
enforcement story is about an embrace of that service role—an embrace that would be a critical
component of the Bureau’s new informational role.
III.

Emergence of Bureau’s Platform within Law Enforcement Ecosystem
A. Capacity Building through the Dyer Act
i.

A Platform for Locals

The Bureau’s experience with the Mann Act showed how its reliance on low-cost
information from local enforcers and aggrieved citizens could deflect its agenda towards cases
that (at least initially) were not a priority. The same informational dynamic played out very
differently in Dyer Act cases, which became the solution to a pressing coordination problem. By
using these cases to vault the jurisdictional hurdles that would otherwise impede the association
of car, thief, and owner, the Bureau made its growing Dyer Act line of business into an
adjudicative component of the larger informational platform that it was assembling within the
criminal justice ecosystem. And it also obtained a sustainable way to serve state and local police,
a service that would somewhat offset the bruises those enforcers suffered when the Bureau
climbed on their backs. Indeed, if one is looking for a through-line from the 1920s to the

129
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criminal policies of the New Deal and beyond, it lay in the operational federalism that was the
132
hallmark of Dyer Act enforcement, not the miserable failure of Prohibition.
During hearings on the Dyer Act, legislators gave no thought to how it would be
enforced. The closest they came to such a discussion was when Representative Newton noted
133
that with the new law, “the Federal grand jury is empowered to investigate such larcenies.”
Indeed, once the Dyer Act was passed, its enforcement appears to have been an open question.
Two months after enactment, the Automobile Underwriters Detective Bureau wrote to the
attorney general inquiring “how a peace officer should proceed in making an arrest and
134
prosecuting under this Act.” Another insurance man wrote to the DOJ, “desirous of being
sworn in as a special agent … to serve without compensation for the purpose of running down …
135
thieves who have been … transporting cars from one state to another.” On the APIB’s part, its
leaders were under the misapprehension that US Marshals were supposed to be pursuing Dyer
Act cases, and so were dismayed at the “laxity” that “existed on the part of the Federal
136
Authorities in the enforcement” of the new law.
To make the most of their lobbying efforts, in 1921, APIB manager Rickards and an
official from the Chicago Crime Commission met with Bureau Chief William Burns and his
assistant J. Edgar Hoover “to discuss methods of closer co-operation between the Department of
Justice Agents and the Association [and] more effectual enforcement of the National Motor
137
Vehicle Theft Act.” What came out of that meeting was clarification of the roles of the various
stakeholders in Dyer Act cases—an example of how associations during this period of “New
138
Federalism” “bridged the divide between bureaucrats and interest groups.” The insurance
cohort and local authorities would inform the feds about potential Dyer Act violations. Law
enforcement—feds and locals both—would learn from insurance experts about investigatory
methods. The APIB not only served as “a clearinghouse for information in connection with
139
stolen automobiles,” but it also published the “Reference Book” indicating where all the
factory numbers and “secret identification numbers” were stamped on different car makes and
140
models. As the APIB reported in its 1922-1923 Annual Report, “the splendid work [the DOJ
and the Bureau] are doing in connection with the enforcement of the National Motor Vehicle Act
132
While Lisa McGirr argues that Prohibition “constituted the formative years of the federal penal state,”
McGirr at __, it was more like an object lesson—of the perils of pursuing a controversial mission without local
buy-in—rather than an origin point or way station.
133
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141

is most gratifying.” It noted having “made a number of special requests of Director Wm. J.
Burns,” and reported that “he has always gladly granted our requests and cooperated to the
142
fullest extent.”
For their part, local police did not hesitate to involve the feds, even in cases that
could—and probably should—have been handled locally. Much criticism ensued when it became
known that many of the Dyer Act defendants were juvenile joyriders, not sophisticated dealers in
143
stolen cars. An early prosecution in 1921 involved two Yale students arrested by the Hartford
144
police after they stole a car and drove it to Binghamton, New York, for a “college dance.”
Many viewed these cases not as a criminal matter, but as a social welfare issue ill-suited for the
145
federal government. The attorney general testified before Congress in 1929 that the “Dyer Act
is producing a great number of prisoners. There is a good deal to be said about the fact that many
of those ought to be tried and punished under State law for theft. [But the states] have got in the
habit of picking up every boy who takes an automobile across the State line and putting him into
146
a Federal institution.” A few years later in 1931, the Wickersham Commission identified 2,243
147
prisoners eighteen or under in federal custody, about 17.5 percent of Dyer Act charges, and
noted that “[i]n almost all cases the purpose in stealing cars was not to sell but to go
148
somewhere.” Representative Dyer was so troubled when he learned of “mere cases of joy-rides
149
by young men” that he introduced a bill in 1930 to repeal his namesake Act. Congress
eventually passed a law mandating that in cases of “juvenile offenders” under the age of

141
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142
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143
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twenty-one, the United States attorney “is authorized to forego the prosecution of such person”
150
and “surrender him” to state authorities.
Local officials often passed juvenile cases on to the feds, in part, because courts ruled
that joyriding—which did not have the necessary intent “to permanently deprive the owner of his
151
car”—did not amount to a crime under state larceny laws. As late as 1959, a legal
commentator observed that this was “peculiarly a state problem,” and so the Dyer Act, which
152
was “sufficiently omnibus as to embrace the act of ‘joyriding,’” was used instead. Some states
responded by expanding the statutory definition of larceny or by creating a new criminal offense
153
of “operating a car without the consent of the owner.” But bringing prosecutions under federal
law had one more advantage: as Attorney General Mitchell noted in 1930, juvenile joyriders,
154
“upon their arrests, admit the theft and make no difficulty about prosecution.” The fear of
federal authority probably prompted many of these guilty pleas. And notwithstanding
claims—echoing those made about the Mann Act—that Congress had meant to target only
155
professional thieves, joyriding offenders continued to dominate the caseload.
As an evidentiary matter, it was also often easier to prove a violation of the Dyer Act
with its straightforward stolen car elements than the accompanying state crime like robbery. This
may explain why many local officials were more than happy to pass along any case involving a
car that crossed a state border. For instance, in July 1931, Chanute, Kansas, police killed one
man, wounded two, and captured a fourth, Lemuel Hawkins—identified as “a former member of
the Kansas City Monarchs baseball team”—after the officers tried to arrest the four “in
156
connection with a holdup earlier in the day at Ottawa, Kan[sas].” Hawkins was charged and
157
convicted solely for violating the Dyer Act and sentenced to two years at Leavenworth.

150
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(Michigan Dept. of Corrections Director notes “in practically all the cases where Dyer Act warrants have been filed
against inmates in Michigan prisons, the car thefts were of the joyriding type and not at all professional in
character”).
156

“Kansas Bandit Slain,” St. Joseph New-Press, July 20, 1931,
https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=z0tkAAAAIBAJ&sjid=TnUNAAAAIBAJ&pg=3101,4406166&dq=lemuel
-hawkins&hl=en
157

http://pendergastke.org/search-solr/field_theme_term/corruption-1003/field_correspondence_series/lemuel-hawkinsinmate-file-10601?sort=field_year&order=asc [check link] On his release, Hawkins, who had been a standout player
in the Negro National League, was shot and killed in a robbery in Chicago, in 1934.

25

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415103

While the Dyer Act thus facilitated “pretextual prosecutions”—where the charge bore
158
only a passing connection to the reason for bringing it —its main value arose when the police
in one locality apprehended someone with a car stolen from another locality, or when the police
in a theft victim’s state needed help from the recovering state. As Hoover—promoted to director
in 1924—explained, even simple Dyer Act investigations generally required “interstate inquiries,
159
which the Bureau makes through its various field offices.” He continued:
The state authorities would be extremely handicapped … by lack of
investigative authority extending from one locality to another, by lack of
funds requisite to subpoena witnesses from one locality to another, by
the necessity of resorting to a complicated system of removal hearings,
extradition writs and other legal necessities which it would be necessary
to invoke and by what I feel sure would be a very positive disinclination
on the part of various local authorities to incur the expense and trouble to
properly enforce the Act where local individuals or individuals of local
160
prominence were not involved.
In short, federal prosecution substituted for interstate information sharing and clunky extradition
161
procedures. Even diligent police chiefs sometimes had to rely on the feds given the
coordination challenges that local law enforcement faced. At an IACP conference in 1927, Chief
J. W. Higgins of Buffalo, New York, complained that although his department assiduously
compiled records on stolen and recovered cars, “other cities are not co-operating with us to the
162
extent we co-operate with them.” Higgins then went on to tell of a case that could not be made
against a bi-coastal car thief until a federal agent drew on the impressive records of the Buffalo
163
Police Department.
In time, local protocols instructing officers to reach out to the feds whenever they
164
recovered an out-of-state stolen car became common. When, in 1927, a Martinsburg, West
158
Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of
Pretextual Prosecutions, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 584 (2005).
159
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“State Joins U.S. Dept. in Auto Theft Cases,” Hartford Courant, July 28, 1921 (reporting that state motor
vehicle commissioner committed to notify the federal bureau of investigation “whenever an arrest is made in
Connecticut for the theft of a motor vehicle in another state and federal agent will be assigned to the case.”).
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Virginia, constable found an abandoned car with Florida plates, he scribbled a note to the Justice
Department, which got passed to Hoover, who, in turn, assured the assistant attorney general for
165
the Criminal Division that the matter would receive the Bureau’s full attention. The constable
appears to have found that car by himself, but Justice Department correspondence indicates that
local recoveries were often spearheaded by insurance company representatives accompanied by
166
local police, who then passed the case on to the feds. In fact, just about all Dyer Act cases
came from state and local officials, and there were many. Rickards reported that in 1921, of the
167
10,505,660 cars in the country, 60,145 had been stolen, and 43,664 had been recovered. Far
from intruding on local matters, Dyer Act cases amounted to the federal collection and
packaging of information for the benefit of all concerned.
ii.

What the Bureau Got in Return

In a 1922 House appropriations hearing, Chief Burns noted with dismay that the
increasing number of Dyer Act cases reflected “a marked tendency on the part of State
168
authorities to shift [] responsibility on[to] Federal authorities.” Regardless what his superior
thought about this trend, J. Edgar Hoover welcomed it. In 1924, when Burns was forced to resign
because of his involvement in the Teapot Dome scandal, the APIB’s annual report noted that it
“received excellent co-operation from Mr. Wm. J. Burns, Former Director, but the present
Director, Mr. J. E. Hoover, is more intensely interested in the enforcement of the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act and fully realizes the effect of automobile thievery on general crime
169
conditions.”
Hoover collaborated not simply because locals sought federal help; he also understood
the benefit to the Bureau. The automobile and insurance industries both closely followed Dyer
Act cases and maintained up-to-date statistics on cars stolen and recovered, the monetary values
Not all states passed the buck. In 1926, explaining why no Dyer Act prisoners came from certain states, the
superintendent of prisons noted, “That means only this, gentlemen, not that there are no motor vehicles being stolen,
but that the State of Massachusetts, for instance, is rigidly enforcing its local law, and, therefore, we get no prisoners
under the national motor vehicle theft law.” Appropriations Bill for 1927, Sixty-Ninth Congress, First Session,
January 1926, at 287 (testimony of Luther C. White, superintendent of prisons). Other states trumpeted their own
efforts. A 1929 magazine article commented, “One reason why Milwaukee recovers ninety-five per cent of all its
stolen automobiles is because it maintains exhaustive records of such stolen property in the Identification Bureau as
well as in the traffic department.” Ruel McDaniel, Wisconsin Gets Her Men, North Amer. Rev. 744, 746 (June
1929).
165
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1927, and June 14, 1927, RG 60, Class 26, NARA.
166
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of those numbers, as well as the total amount of fines and sentences imposed. Testifying at a
House appropriations hearing in 1926, Hoover mentioned having “just received” an annual
report from the Theft Committee of the National Automobile Underwriters Conference, which
highlighted how the most recent fine and recovery data “prove conclusively that the Department
of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, is enforcing the national motor vehicle theft act and your
170
committee firmly believes that this arm of the Government is serving the public 100 percent.”
Hoover was certainly not shy about deploying this broad-based industry support—and the steady
stream of statistics—during congressional appropriations hearings. Nor was he even original.
Before his disgrace, Attorney General Daugherty had in 1922 touted both “the value of the stolen
motor vehicles recovered by the Bureau of Investigation” and the “[e]xcellent cooperation”
between DOJ agents, “peace officers throughout the United States,” and “the insurance
171
companies writing auto theft insurance.” The relationship between bureaucratic actors, private
beneficiaries, and congressional overseers in this space was starting to look a lot like the “iron
172
triangles” that would develop in other regulatory spaces.
The support of local law enforcement was foundational. When, in 1929, Hoover
misinterpreted an inquiry from his boss about whether Dyer Act cases should be prosecuted in
state courts, he foresaw “considerable embarrassment to the Department” should the suggestion
173
be implemented. He warned “that should the Bureau discontinue its investigative activities
under this Act, considerable criticism would be developed from large insurance interests as well
174
as automobile and law enforcement interests throughout the country.” While the legend of
Hoover as grand manipulator might argue for reading the “would be developed” language as an
unsubtle reference to what Hoover himself would do, the police’s reliance on the feds in these
cases, as well as the interests of the insurance industry, counsel taking this more as an easy
prediction. The 2,123 Dyer Act convictions obtained in 1929 constituted 53.75% of the 3,950
175
Justice Department convictions (including 457 under the Mann Act). Not only would this
focus on Dyer Act cases largely continue until World War II, but, as shown here, the Bureau’s
proportionate commitment to these cases would remain steady as its budget significantly
increased.
176
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Table 2. Bureau Appropriations Compared to Percentage of Dyer and Mann Act
177
Convictions.

It wasn’t that the Bureau lacked other matters crying out for its investigative intervention.
As David Grann recounts in Killers of the Flower Moon, in the spring of 1923, when the Osage
Tribal Council appealed to the Justice Department to investigate a growing spate of murders
targeting its members, Chief Burns dispatched agents to pursue desultory inquiries, largely at the
178
tribe’s expense. On becoming director, Hoover decided “to dump the case back on state
179
authorities in order to evade responsibility for the failure.” He was stymied, however, by the
177
For conviction numbers see supra n ote 159. Appropriation amounts were taken from Attorney General
Annual Reports 1921 - 1940.
178
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outcry that ensued when the outlaw that agents had freed from an Oklahoma prison to assist in
180
their investigation robbed a bank and killed a police officer. The Bureau did conduct an
investigation, but with an inadequacy that Grann makes clear in sad detail. In contrast, Dyer Act
cases were manageable matters with the promise of total success.
It was through the Bureau’s service t o commercial interests and local law enforcement
181
that the fledgling agency not only justified its existence but could also expand its capacity. An
assistant director at the Bureau explained in 1930 that “the bureau’s representatives in various
sections of the country are dependent in very many instances upon the good will of sheriffs’
offices and other law-enforcement officials for cooperative support in the conduct of
182
investigations.” Hoover further elaborated that the Bureau’s close relationships with local
police saved money; instead of sending an agent from Dallas all the way to the Panhandle to
check on a subject and his “reputation” as part of a routine investigation, an agent could simply
183
wire the police chief or sheriff who would do it for the Bureau “without any cost to us.”
In 1935, a columnist close to Hoover disclosed how the “service” aspect of the Dyer Act
contributed to the expansion of the Bureau’s own capabilities:
Before the passage of this act, the run of bureau cases was tied tightly to
the business of the Federal Government: there was little opportunity to
be of assistance to State and local law-enforcement agencies. The new
law widened tremendously the scope of activities. True, if a man robbed
a bank, that was not the bureau’s business since the robbery of even a
national bank [] was not a Federal crime until less than two years ago.
But if that robber stole a car during that holdup and crossed a State line,
he then became a fugitive from Federal justice. … A Federal chase for a
violator of the national vehicle theft act has often led to the solution of a
local mystery. A motivating crime is found, the theft of the car being the
act of the moment, impelled by something quite different—usually the
desire to escape from some other law violation. The Federal agency
therefore frequently becomes an assisting agency to the enforcement
bodies of the Nation, later withdrawing from the case if the State charge
184
is the more serious.
In this account, the broad enforcement discretion federalization afforded the Bureau became a
licence to help, not encroach on state and local domains.
180

Id. at 110-111.

181
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The low profile of most car thefts meant that they usually did not spark turf wars. Since
the Bureau generally pursued Dyer Act cases at the behest of local authorities, there was little
risk that “federal intervention” would raise local hackles. What the Bureau did could more
accurately be described as federal “processing,” with local police initiating the inquiry and the
Bureau passing the gift-wrapped cases back to local authorities (perhaps in another jurisdiction)
to prosecute. Hoover noted in 1929 that “in some instances we find that prosecution is instituted
in State Courts under local Statutes, particularly where the case holds some local interest or
where important witnesses are readily available without the State incurring a large expenditure.”
185
Happy to let the locals take the credit in these cases, the Bureau just wanted the limelight in
higher profile cases that also required considerable local assistance.
iii.

Public Enemies and the War on Crime

The high-profile cases were the ones that captured the nation’s attention and provoked
the public into calling for greater federal intervention. Even President Herbert Hoover, the
stalwart defender of local rule, could not ignore these demands. In 1930, during Prohibition’s
final years, he announced that the federal government would provide reinforcements in “an
186
intensified cooperative drive against racketeering in Chicago and elsewhere.” This
announcement prompted newspapers to report that “the nation wars on racketeering,” indeed, it
187
was “more than a war, it is a revolution … against gangster and hoodlum rule.”
Anxieties about crime reached fever pitch in 1932, when Charles Lindbergh’s
188
twenty-month-old son was kidnapped from his own home. Hoover and Attorney General
Mitchell directed all federal police agencies, but especially the Bureau, to “cooperate to the
utmost with the State authorities,” who were led by New Jersey State Police Colonel
189
Schwarzkopf (the future general’s father). But the Bureau could not do much. For one thing,
the only federal jurisdictional hook available at the time was the Dyer Act, and Mitchell noted
that there was no reason yet to believe that the culprits had driven a stolen vehicle across state
lines. Second, Schwarzkopf rebuffed Director Hoover’s offers to help by refusing to give the
190
Bureau fingerprint evidence for testing. After the baby’s body was found two months after the
191
kidnapping, the public demanded a national response.
185
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Congress promptly considered several bills to make the transportation of kidnapped
192
persons over state lines a federal offense. Mitchell was hesitant about this expansion of federal
jurisdiction, confessing that he could not recommend such legislation in light of his department’s
193
budget limitations. He also pointed out that if such a law had been on the books in the
Lindbergh case, the public would have demanded federal involvement, local authorities would
have then relaxed their own efforts, and the government would have expended manpower and
money “only to find out at the end that no federal crime had been committed as there had been
194
no interstate transportation.” But given the national uproar, Mitchell yielded and advised
President Hoover not to veto the kidnapping bill, stating that he had “no objection to such a
195
measure if Congress desires to pass it.”
The Lindbergh case and aftermath confirmed that high-profile cases could generate
public support for greater federal action, and the subsequent Roosevelt administration seized on
the string of high-profile kidnappings and bank robberies when launching its war on crime.
Indeed, banner headlines punctuated Roosevelt’s first year in office, in 1933. In the June
“Kansas City massacre,” a group of notorious gangsters ambushed law enforcement authorities
196
and left an agent dead during an attempt to free one of their own in federal custody. In July,
197
“Machine Gun” Kelly kidnapped an oil tycoon for ransom. Later that year, John Dillinger and
his crew killed the Lima, Ohio, sheriff during a jailbreak, launching a nationwide manhunt for
198
the outlaw.
Responding to this breakdown in law and order, Roosevelt’s attorney general, Homer
199
Cummings, rolled out a “twelve point plan for crime prevention.” To justify this legislative
package, Cummings couldn’t help but take a swipe at local officers and even lawyers who failed
200
to maintain standards of professionalism and entered into “an unholy alliance” with racketeers.
But he focused most on the “twilight zone,” the area in “between the jurisdictions of the Federal
192
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201

and State Governments” where “the predatory criminal takes hopeful refuge.” This was, of
course, a problem that IACP leaders had identified even before the twentieth century. Assuring
those wary of federal government overreach, Cummings avowed that the “Federal Government
has no desire to extend its jurisdiction beyond cases in which, due to the nature of the crime
202
itself, it is impossible for the States adequately to protect themselves.”
To bolster support for the war on crime, the administration also brought the high-profile
cases home to the average “John Public.” In July 1933, Roosevelt’s chief political advisor, Louis
Howe, published an article in the Saturday Evening Post with a headline announcing that “Uncle
Sam Starts after Crime,” which explained that the “average citizen at least [was] beginning to
consider the organized criminal as a personal danger to him and to his family.” During the
economic depression, kidnapping for ransom was making “every man with a comfortable income
203
uneasy lest he, personally, be the next victim.” “John Public” was now beginning to
understand that “the kidnapper cannot be eliminated without eliminating the gangster, and the
204
gangster cannot be eliminated without eliminating the racketeer.”
Notwithstanding the heightened attention on Public Enemy cases, Dyer Act cases
remained the foundation for the Bureau’s business. Juxtaposing the crime war’s discourse and
operational realities highlights how the Bureau managed to project an outsized image of its
capacity relative to its small size. The Bureau pursued some noted Bad Guys and, to the extent
possible, maintained control over those cases, both to ensure success and to credibly claim credit.
But “to the extent possible” is a critical caveat, for the Bureau could make its high-profile cases
only with considerable cooperation from the same local authorities it wanted in the shadows. The
Bureau’s assiduous work on its “service” lines of business, particularly the Dyer Act, would
more than offset these informational and resource “withdrawals” from its local counterparts.
Also offset were the Bureau’s occasional forays into vice and corruption that occasionally
205
implicated local police and raised the hackles of their congressional protectors, or into civil
rights enforcement, which once started in 1940, was largely limited by “state action” concerns to
206
police officers.
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Dyer Act cases provided an inexhaustible platform for sustained collaboration in which
locals got a large piece of the action whenever they were up for it. In a 1938 appropriations
hearing—a year when Dyer Act cases produced 2,093 out of 5,420 convictions (with Mann Act
207
convictions a distant second, at 576) —Hoover brushed aside the suggestion that the Bureau
was working on cases that were “not really proper matters” for the federal agency. He explained
that “if we find that the local authorities are diligent and energetic we let them take the case,”
208
which was “true of most of the large cities.” As a result, the Bureau was able to “direct our
efforts only to those cases in which we have primary jurisdiction or where the local authorities
209
cannot or will not function.” The celebrated newspaperman Damon Runyon noticed these
priorities in a 1939 column. Having just read the Bureau’s annual report for 1937-1938, he
remarked, “What interests us as much as anything else is the way those G-fellows go after
210
automobile thieves.” The Dyer Act cases provided the institutional ballast to offset any
potential disruption to the Bureau’s relationship with locals when it swooped in to take
kidnapping cases, “alienat[ing] many local cops by always taking full credit for any successful
211
case and blaming local police for any failures.”
Law enforcement’s pursuit of the infamous gangster John Dillinger illustrates the fine
line that Hoover had to walk between showcasing his Bureau’s effectiveness and appeasing
locals. When Tucson, Arizona, police apprehended Dillinger in January 1934, Hoover publicly
212
“expressed his satisfaction with the performance of Tucson and county peace officers.” The
president of a “scientific protection firm” congratulated Hoover on the success of “your men”
and voiced his “suspicion” that Hoover had directed “the credit” to the local police, noting: “I’m
sure this will pay you many times in securing the co-operation of the local police departments
213
with your men.” Hoover agreed, careful not to correct the writer’s misimpression, that “this

local police because of the need for their cooperation in other Bureau matters.” Fred J. Cook, The FBI Nobody
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practice on the part of newspapers will aid materially in securing the cooperation of the local and
214
Federal authorities.”
Then in March, Dillinger escaped from the Crown Point County Jail in Indiana with help
215
from corrupt local officials. Hoover promptly mobilized the Bureau to pursue Dillinger, who
had committed multiple Dyer Act violations—a fact always noted in the case heading. This
massive federal effort, and the headlines it garnered, came just as Congress was considering
216
Roosevelt’s crime legislative package and doubtless sped its passage. It was not the only
conspicuous targeting of a Public Enemy at this politically important time. On April 6,
Cummings announced that his Department was entering the search for Bonnie Parker and Clyde
Barrow because “federal assistance in a co-operative effort” was necessary “to suppress this kind
217
of crime.”
This political backdrop (and perhaps also concerns about local corruption) made federal
branding even more important in the hunt for Dillinger and his gang. When Special Agent
Melvin Purvis asked headquarters whether “he should solicit the assistance of local law
enforcement” when conducting raids in the case, Hoover sent instructions that “such raids should
be conducted by Division Agents exclusively whenever possible,” with outreach to locals only if
218
219
“absolutely necessary.” Still, even with around thirty-eight agents assigned full-time, the
Bureau would not have been able to track Dillinger without considerable assistance from local
220
police, like those in Kentucky, where he visited soon after his escape, and in Port Huron,
Michigan, where an under-sheriff was killed in the course of apprehending a man who had
221
escaped with Dillinger.
Maintaining tight Bureau control over the Dillinger manhunt—for both political and
operational reasons—while not aggrieving state and local police could be challenging. In April,
IACP’s president quietly chided Hoover’s media-hogging and noted press reports of Hoover’s
222
“constant and devoted search for Dillinger.” “While your faithful agents are making every
effort to apprehend this man,” he allowed, “we likewise are making a similar effort,” he pointed
214
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out. He ended the letter by guaranteeing that the “entire force” of the IACP would be “at YOUR
223
disposal.” For its part, the Bureau took pains to shoot down a press report “to the effect that
this Division has not cooperated with [local] law enforcement officials” because it had “caused
considerable embarrassment particularly because it is not true . . . and secondarily because it has
224
caused collaborators of the Division to feel offended and hurt.”
While the Bureau’s service work for state and local enforcers somewhat offset its failure
to credit their collaboration in the pursuit of Famous Bad Guys, the wide (and carefully tended)
public support for the Bureau’s exploits required that such collaboration never appear to be
withheld. Later in April 1934, a flurry of internal memos followed a newspaper report quoting
Senator Copeland of New York, chair of the Senate Racketeering Committee, as noting “‘a
pathetic failure of co-operation between Federal, State and local authorities’ in the Dillinger
225
case.” Immediately, as Hoover told the attorney general, local police throughout the Midwest
were put “on the defensive” when reporters started asking “where they have failed to cooperate.”
226
The head of the Michigan State Police, Oscar Olander, had told reporters of vainly offering
help to the Bureau in apprehending Dillinger. It turned out that Olander, who was close with
Copeland, had been told by his men that, when they asked to accompany agents and a sheriff on
the raid, an agent had said: “Tell the State Police to go to Hell. When the State Police are wanted
they will be called upon.” Olander later explained that reporters had asked him about Dillinger’s
presence in Michigan and that Olander had to admit ignorance. So he was put in “an
embarrassing position” and made the statements to defend himself after the Copeland remarks,
not to criticize the Bureau. Olander assured the Bureau that not only was he a big fan, but when a
Michigan congressman had tried to get him to make a “statement against the [Bureau],” he had
227
refused.
After a bloody failed attempt to capture Dillinger in late April, Hoover demanded that
228
“Public Enemy #1” be given priority over all other matters. Intergovernmental relations were
still critical though. When Indiana Governor McNutt told a Bureau official that his “chief desire
is to have a member of the State Police present when Dillinger was captured,” the official
assured him that the Bureau would call “whenever possible.” But the official took care to
substitute the director of public safety, whom the Bureau knew and trusted, for the state police
captain whom the governor had suggested (and who had been on Dillinger’s trail for almost a
229
year). Ultimately, it was another Indiana force, the East Chicago police, that provided the
223
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critical information. They had an informant in contact with Dillinger, and two officers were
230
eager to help if they could “work with” the Bureau. (They may also have been looking for
231
reward money; they did seek it thereafter. ) Dillinger was ambushed at the Biograph Theater
232
days later. Even as the Bureau sought to manage its relationships with state police agencies,
dependence on local police was virtually non-negotiable.
iv.

Implications

Historians have pointed to Roosevelt’s administration as a major turning point in the
federal government’s increasing involvement in the traditionally local sphere of crime and
punishment. There were, indeed, a busy few years. In 1934, Congress passed nine crime bills,
built Alcatraz prison, and formally authorized Bureau agents to carry guns and make arrests for
the first time. To demonstrate the federal government’s attention to the crime problem, national
lawmakers in 1935 rechristened the Bureau of Investigation. It became the Federal Bureau of
233
Investigation.
But examining what, exactly, FDR’s war on crime entailed suggests far more continuity
with the 1920s. Before coming to the White House, while New York Governor, he had
bemoaned the national government’s “dangerous tendency” “to encroach” on “State supremacy”
in criminal matters.234 And Columbia law professor Raymond Moley--tasked by Roosevelt’s
advisor Louis Howe with devising a criminal justice policy -- would note in his 1934 report to
the president that “it is very important not to permit the citizen or his local government to get the
idea that the suppression of crime will be entirely assumed by Federal enforcement machinery.”
235

What really separated Roosevelt’s crime policy from Hoover’s was that its interventionist
moves, however modest, were of a piece with a larger ideological program to promote national

230
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236

solutions for addressing what had hitherto been considered local matters. Yet even as the
Roosevelt administration envisioned a robust national state to tackle the problems of modern
society, it understood that the war on crime could not shore up the Bureau’s—and J. Edgar
237
Hoover’s—power at the expense of local law enforcement.
Further suggesting continuity is that little in Roosevelt’s program was new, with much of
it having been introduced in Congress, with broad support, under President Hoover. For instance,
the House in 1932 considered bills on racketeering (Cummings’ point no. 1), stolen property
(point no. 2, which was essentially an extension of the Dyer Act), and the interstate shipment of
238
firearms (point no. 11). Point no. 3 concerned two bills “strengthening and extending the
so-called Lindbergh kidnapping statute” that Congress had passed in 1932. The purpose of these
bills was to clarify when, exactly, federal agents could join a kidnapping investigation since the
interstate nature of a particular crime often would not be discovered until after the conclusion of
a case; Congress wanted to specify that “if a kidnapped person is not released after three days,
239
interstate transportation shall be presumed.” Even the new crimes—like the prohibition on the
robbing of federal banks (point no. 5) and killing federal officers (point no. 6)—were “modest
and logical improvements” as one historian described them, and certainly not designed to grow
240
the federal bureaucracy. As Moley clarified in his report, there was “no intention that the
United States Government should supersede State authorities in these cases, but the bill is to give
241
Federal authorities the power to cooperate with local forces when necessary.” Indeed,
Cummings pointedly refused to support a new push for an anti-lynching law. While his
explanation was that “lynching was a local matter,” his real concern was fear that support would
242
jeopardize southern support for other criminal legislation.
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Perhaps most revealing is point no. 12—on a “law authorizing agreements between two
or more States for mutual cooperation in the prevention of crime”—which was first introduced in
the House, also back in 1932. In explaining the purpose of his bill, Representative Sumners
pointed out that there was “just one of two things” that the federal government could do in
response to crimes carried out across state lines: either send criminal functions “back to the
243
States” or “reconcile ourselves to be governed by a great Federal bureaucracy.” As a national
legislator, he had “seen enough slobbering over these criminals and heard enough maudlin
sentimentality about them.” He wanted the federal government to retreat from criminal matters,
and his way out was to “give two sovereign States the privilege of entering into any agreement
244
they want to, to protect their citizens against people who ought to be shot on sight.” A critical
part of FDR’s legislative package was thus a law giving blanket congressional consent to
interstate compacts, as required by Article 1 of the Constitution, “for cooperative effort and
mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal
245
laws and policies” as a measure to avoid expanding the federal law enforcement apparatus.
Although the Administration’s promotion of interstate compact suggests a desire to
increase state-to-state enforcement collaborations unmediated by federal authorities, it probably
had mixed feelings on the matter, or at least it didn’t put serious money on the table to that end.
Conspicuously absent from its program were the sort of financial grants-in-aid to the states that
would have given states—and perhaps their subdivisions—more programmatic control, even if
246
conditional. This was a significant road not taken. As Jon Teaford has insightfully observed,
the federal government can empower states within a policy space by making them—not
247
localities—the unit of engagement for funding and regulatory purposes. Indeed, Karen Tani
has shown precisely how that happened during the New Deal with respect to federal welfare
248
policy. Yet the converse played out for criminal law enforcement during this period, no
249
parallel effort to erode “the bedrock of localism.”
It may be that the Administration’s failure to elevate states as counterparties was
overdetermined. Criminal law enforcement’s dependence on local connections and their closely
held information will tend to pull authority down to the lowest levels even in the most
243
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250

centralized national policing regimes, and America’s commitment to localized criminal justice
ran (and continues to run) deep. Moreover, state police forces were underdeveloped latecomers
in the 1930s, and in these early years, most states authorized their forces to enforce only traffic
251
and highway safety laws. Ideological concerns about centralized police also applied to state
police, and the states’ domain in the criminal enforcement space was largely limited to providing
penal laws and prisons. In the South, concerns that governors—perhaps more attentive to the
state’s reputation beyond—would unduly intrude on local white supremacy norms only
252
reinforced resistance to state centralization.
Yet not only did the Administration fail to materially promote interstate coordination, it
also likely retarded it. Even though the Constitution’s Extradition Clause provided for the return
253
254
of fugitives from one state to another, the “asylum” state’s oft-abused discretion and the
perceived “inefficiency” of extradition processes rendered the procedure largely defunct. Rather
than wait for modernizing reforms (which would have required considerable state legislation),
the Administration proposed the Fugitive Felon Act, which essentially provided a substitute for
255
extradition. Under the new regime, the Bureau would use federal charges to obtain jurisdiction
over fleeing felons and then turn them over to the local authorities seeking them. The Bureau
256
having played its keystone role, federal charges would thereupon be dismissed. In the 1938
250
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“Handbook” produced by the Interstate Commission on Crime—an organization established in
1935 to facilitate state-to-state crime control—an assistant to Attorney General Cummings
celebrated how the Fugitive Felon Act solved the “problem” posed by the “archaic character of
the state’s own extradition law” or “lack of funds” that prevented the transfer of a fugitive even
257
in cases where the “distant” state tried to cooperate. The federal statute was well received,
even in southern states. It enabled, for instance, Georgia authorities to obtain custody of an
African American who fled to New York to avoid being lynched, despite New York Governor
Lehman’s refusal to “even entertain” an extradition request unless the charges against the man
258
were reduced. Indeed, complaints about the discretionary aspects of state extradition processes
259
and their general inadequacies would continue for decades.
The Fugitive Felon Act thus further solidified the Bureau’s position as the federal
government’s prime negotiator of its relationships with state and local—but mostly
local—enforcers. This arrangement was affirmed at the 1934 Crime Conference, the Roosevelt
administration’s big event, intended to demonstrate its seriousness about crime. Attorney
General Cummings’ opening remarks set the agenda for the gathering: “Just how far the work of
the federal department should go and just what the form of interrelation between the agencies
representing the state and federal governments should be,” he posited, was “one of the crucial
260
questions which faces us in this Conference.” Earl Warren, then district attorney of Alameda
City, California, maintained that “there must be an integration of all law enforcement activities”
and that he “wish[ed] to see this done, not by transferring our local police powers to the Federal
Government nor by shifting the responsibility for maintaining law and order to Washington, D.C.
261
but by bringing about a degree of cooperation and coordination of activity.” Bureau Director
Hoover could not agree more. The “best and only kind of a National Police which America will
tolerate,” he insisted, was “local officers with a knowledge of local conditions and local
262
criminals” who performed their duties with “the support of the Federal Government.”
Notwithstanding the limited federal role that all the Crime Conference participants agreed
was important to uphold, the war on crime did enlarge the Bureau’s domain over criminal
matters. Whether pursuing its own enforcement goals or helping locals to solve their own cases,
the Bureau would need a lot more agents. In his report, Moley suggested that “the field
263
investigating force should immediately be increased to not less than 1,000.” Hoover himself
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informed the attorney general that he would need an additional 200 special agents and 70
264
accountants, which would nearly double the Bureau’s existing manpower.
Such expansion would still leave the Bureau unable to actually enforce the growing
number of federal criminal statutes without considerable assistance from state and local
authorities. Yet the very lack of statutory attention to constrained federal capacity increased the
Bureau’s effective authority. Moley recognized, for instance, that proposed legislation
“practically assumes [federal] jurisdiction in all cases of bank robbery or burglary” and that this
265
was “a very considerable extension of Federal responsibility.” Although the statute did not
actually say so, Moley envisioned that it applied only to “professional criminals who move from
State to State and in many instances operate on a national scale,” and “not [] to local criminals.”
266
But the Bureau’s experience with white slavery and auto theft cases suggested that this
distinction would not always be so clear-cut. Moley admitted as much when he concluded that
ensuring the proper division of local and federal responsibilities would have to “be found in an
attempt to operate the bill” and “depend upon the wisdom with which its enforcement is
267
attended.” That “wisdom” would be the discretion of Hoover and his Bureau, sometimes with
guidance from the Attorney General, to determine when to intervene and which cases to leave to
the locals, all the while nurturing the collaborative relationship that he had been developing for
years. And the exercise of this discretion would remain racialized. Even when the NAACP
appealed to Roosevelt to use the federal kidnapping law against two southern lynchings in which
the victims had been transported over state lines, Cummings advised the president that doing so
268
would be inappropriate absent more authority from Congress.
B. National Identification and Information Division
By creating opportunities to package criminal information for the shared benefit of the
Bureau and local enforcers, Dyer Act prosecutions helped ensconce the relatively new federal
agency in the national policing ecosystem. Further establishing the Bureau was a more expansive
stewardship of criminal information -- both identification data and the crime statistics that
ultimately became the Uniform Crime Reporting system. The collection and management of both
not only gave the Bureau a further opportunity to serve and promote the interests of local
departments, but put the Bureau at the forefront of an effort to centralize and order information
about crime and criminals (and many non-criminals) and to maximize the returns from that data.
The Bureau’s leadership in this endeavor enhanced its nationwide status by burnishing its claims
to professionalism and expertise,269 and implicitly highlighting the inadequacies of local
264
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knowledge. It also gave the Bureau a central role in a larger “legibility” process -- to use James
Scott’s powerful term about a state’s commitment to “map” its terrain and people270 -- that was
foundational to the state-building during this period.
In 1921, twenty years after it unsuccessfully proposed “a National Bureau of Criminal
Identification” to Congress, the IACP tried again, this time with the Bureau’s assistance. After
meeting with IACP representatives, Chief William Burns announced his intention to establish a
271
national fingerprint registry. Two years later, the IACP “unanimously adopted” resolutions to
transfer its records—all 138,000 of them—to the DOJ before Congress had even authorized the
272
federal agency to collect them. Burns, also impatient with congressional inaction, unilaterally
273
ordered all records from the federal prison in Leavenworth to be transferred to Washington. Its
hand forced, Congress held hearings on the matter the following year.
Concerns about centralized policing continued to loom large during the 1924 hearings. A
national criminal identification database seemed too close to the registration of citizens
274
maintained by centralized states on the continent. Several members of Congress also raised
questions about the cost of setting up such an agency—figures ranged from $56,000 to
275
$200,000—and, more importantly, which department would house it. Simmering underneath
were questions about whether the project would lead to a national police force and how it would
affect the federal-state relationship on law enforcement matters, particularly at a time when
National Prohibition was straining that relationship.
Unsurprisingly, Chief Burns wanted the new division within the DOJ. The Justice
Department was in charge of Leavenworth, which was already exchanging prisoner information
276
with local police departments. It made sense, then, that the DOJ would also handle the
exchange of fingerprints for the entire country. Accordingly, Burns calculated that $56,000
would be enough to expand Leavenworth’s operations, and he did “not think” that he would “be
277
asking for an increase year by year.”
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But New York City Police Commissioner Enright vehemently objected. As Simon Cole
reports, New York “had a history of exploiting its position as the nation’s most populous state to
try to win control of the country’s criminal information infrastructure, always to the annoyance
of the IACP.278 And if the NYPD would not be in charge, neither should the feds be. In 1924,
Enright avowed that his department “will never file a criminal record with any central bureau”
unless it was “under police control.”279 Now Enright wanted “an independent bureau,” and “to
280
start an organization” completely from scratch would require at least $200,000. When
Congressman Hersey informed him that “a separate bureau is rather obnoxious to us at
281
Washington,” Enright responded, “We feel this way regarding the Department of Justice.” If
Congress did not want to create a new federal bureaucracy, then Enright suggested—in a canny
effort to avoid making the Justice Department the beneficent party in so many transactions in the
282
criminal informational economy—“putting it under the Department of the Interior.” But this
made no sense, Representative Dyer pointed out, because the Interior Department did not enforce
283
criminal laws. Enright countered that the project “must rest on good will” to receive
284
cooperation—that is, information—from local departments. And “good will will not flow …
285
from our police departments” to the DOJ, he insisted. When Hersey pressed him, Enright
answered that there was “not very much friendship between the Department of Justice and most
286
of the police departments of our country.” According to Enright, opposition to the DOJ had
287
“always existed.” Enright feared that oversight of the information exchange would be a
slippery slope to the usurpation of local control. “We want a medium,” Enright explained, “but
288
we do not want it in the place it might lead to control.”
Notwithstanding Enright’s claims -- which were colored by his department’s ambitions
289
and its opposition to the federal Prohibition mission -- most police departments did not harbor
278
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290

animosity toward the Justice Department or the Bureau. Still, House members did seriously
consider under what authority the federal government could “compel the chiefs of police
291
commissioners to furnish this information to [a federal] official.” It seemed necessary,
according to one representative, to connect the “constitutional grant of power” to “the purpose of
obtaining information” for an existing federal department fulfilling its duties under federal laws.
292

This was where the passage of time and intervening events made a difference. In 1901,
when the IACP first proposed the bill, the Mann Act was still nearly a decade away.293 By 1924,
when Congress reconsidered the bill, the federal government had not only the Mann Act, but also
the Volstead Act and the Dyer Act. Chief Burns testified that in the year since the IACP handed
over its information bureau to the DOJ, it was already proving to be effective in solving federal
294
crimes, such as “stealing automobiles, the Mann Act, [and] impersonations.” Convinced,
Congress established the National Identification Division in July 1924 and, significantly, housed
295
it in the Bureau of Investigation.
Although the federal government’s own needs helped convince a wary Congress, the
needs of local governments might well have been more critical to sustained congressional
support. Indeed at the heart of the Bureau’s appropriations strategy during this period (and long
after) was an appreciation of the sway state and local enforcers had with Congress.
Congressional support for purely federal law enforcement projects would come and go. But
legislators’ support for the police departments primarily responsible for protecting their
constituents would be a permanent feature of the political landscape.
Even after the division’s establishment, the IACP continued to remind its members to
“enlighten Senators and Representatives in Congress from their respective districts regarding the
success and value of the Division of Information and Identification, that they may readily
296
comprehend its worth and assist in its upbuilding.” Hoover himself encouraged the locals to
take pride and ownership over the criminal registry system. As he told IACP members at its 1925

290
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297

convention, the “Division of Identification is your child.” The following year, he expressed the
298
same sentiment differently: “Of you, by you and for you.” This perfectly encapsulates the
origins and function of the division. It was established largely because of the efforts of
progressive police chiefs (by you); it depended on information that local law enforcement shared
with the Bureau (of you); and it maintained an information clearinghouse that aided the locals
(for you) , not to mention the Bureau as well. FBI critic Max Lowenthal would later claim that
the Bureau had taken over the IACP and Leavenworth fingerprint registries to “eliminate
299
competition,” but the Bureau’s “customers” were fully complicit.
The mutuality of benefits was precisely why the Identification Division proved so
successful. Just two years after Congress authorized it, Hoover announced that he could “now
say that we have achieved a practically unanimity of support for the National Division of
Identification of all the Chiefs of Police of all the cities in the United States and Canada of large
300
size.” He was particularly pleased to report that even New York and Chicago—the two cities
that had the most fractious relationship with federal authorities because of National
Prohibition—had come around and “developed a close relationship of mutual interest and
301
cooperation” with the Bureau. Moving forward, the goal was now “to secur[e] every possible
extension of the scope, influence and value of the National Division of Identification” by
entering “into continued relations with the sheriffs of every county, in each state of the country.”
302

Management of the Identification Division extended “the scope, influence and value” of
the Bureau as well. Police departments grateful for its services returned the favor by gathering
information for the Bureau when needed. As one pundit put it, “When the local officials are
puzzled the national bureau clears up the doubt. When Uncle Sam is puzzled, he can call on any
303
of the local officials for information.” Several scholars have noted how this collaboration
placed Hoover “at the head of a law enforcement community drawn into a cooperative network.”
304

The Bureau also expanded the range of data it collected. When IACP leaders testified
before Congress in 1924, they suggested that the Identification Division could also compile a
host of other facts that could aid law enforcement. This included “daily lists of stolen
automobiles, names, numbers, and data that might lead to recovery,” and more generally,
“reports of crimes,” “reports of threatened or contemplated depredations by enemies of State,”
and “names and descriptions of outlaw organizations and of persons belonging to bomb
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305

gangs”—information of particular interest on the heels of the Red Scare. In 1926, the IACP
was thrilled to report that Congress had “endorsed the work” of the Identification Division “by
306
extending appropriations for the advancement of the undertaking” as they had envisioned.
More significantly, legislators would begin studying the feasibility of receiving “crime statistics
and other subjects germane to the division under the law, all to be afforded enforcing offices
307
[check quote] as information for the prevention, suppression and detection of crime.”
In fact, by the 1920s, calls for better and more statistical data on all things crime related
were heard from a diverse array of constituents, from law enforcement to census wonks, from
308
lawyers to social scientists. They were also in agreement that the present situation of data
collection and analysis was woefully inadequate. The National Crime Commission deemed that
309
“the United States had the worst criminal statistics of any civilized country.” A handful of
states and private associations as well as the federal government had been keeping some form of
310
criminal records since the nineteenth century; New York was the first to start in 1829. But
what everyone wanted was a comprehensive, cohesive, and systematic picture of crimes
committed, who was committing them, and what was happening to them from arrest to
imprisonment. Columbia law professor Raymond Moley identified four different categories of
information: crime complaints, identification and characteristics of arrested persons, judicial
311
statistics, and penal statistics.
Progressive reformers had for decades championed surveys as a tool for criminal justice
reform. Unsurprisingly, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, formed
in 1929 and headed by former attorney general George Wickersham, touted the importance of
data, noting “[s]tatistics are needed to tell us, or at least to help us tell us, what we have to do
312
now, how we are doing it, and how far what we are doing responds to what we have to do.”
313
The commissioners deplored that “no such data can be had for the country as a whole.”
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Here again, fragmentation of authority was the problem. Few states compiled criminal
statistics, and those that did used heterogenous methods that rendered comparative studies futile.
314
Moreover, any national effort to promote the collection and sharing of comparable statistics
would have to depend on states’ willingness to participate. While Article 1 of the Constitution
authorized the federal government to gather statistics on persons, the Wickersham Commission
recognized that that authority was “hardly broad enough to cover all that is needed for a
315
complete system of nation-wide criminal statistics.” The national government’s authority to
gather data was thought to cover only that related to an existing federal activity. As a result, by
1930, three different federal departments managed the compilation of three different types of
criminal statistics: the Census Bureau had prison statistics, the Children’s Bureau had statistics
316
on juvenile courts and delinquency, and the Identification Division had police statistics. To
ensure uniformity and ease in use, the commission concluded that the “[c]ompilation and
317
publication of criminal statistics should be centralized … in one Federal bureau.”
The question was, which one? Among the three, the Wickersham Commission insisted
that the responsibility ought not to go to the Bureau. Its reasons lay in its effort to separate
politics from policy, a common concern of progressive reformers. According to the Report on
Criminal Statistics, the compilation and publication of statistics were best handled by “some
detached bureau unaffected by the desires of the bureau or agency whose activities are to be
pictures”—in other words, not “any bureau or agency which is engaged in administering the
318
criminal law.” Otherwise, the conflicted agency might tinker with the process or data “to make
319
for itself the most favorable showing possible.” The Wickersham commissioners were worried
that the Bureau would marshal criminal statistics to justify its expanding authority. “It takes but
little experience,” the report maintained, “to convince that a serious abuse exists in compiling
them [criminal statistics] as a basis for requesting appropriations or for justifying the existence of
or urging expanded powers and equipment for the agency in question rather than for the purposes
320
which criminal statistics are designed to further.”
By the time the Wickersham Commission issued its report in 1931, however Congress
321
had already selected the Bureau. The Bureau got this capacity-expanding assignment because
the project depended on voluntary participation, and collaborative pathways with local police
had already been laid. In 1928, the IACP suggested that “the Identification Division of the
Department of Justice might be a very logical place in which to assemble statistics on crime,
because all fingerprints taken in connection with felonies in the United States are sent to” the
314
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322

Bureau. In fact, the IACP had already formed the Committee on Uniform Crime Records while
323
waiting for congressional action. Just two months after Congress put the Bureau in charge, the
324
IACP gladly transferred its work to the Bureau.
What had begun as the compilation of prisoners’ fingerprints now encompassed much
more, as reflected in the division’s new name, the National Division of Identification and
Information. The broadened scope is also evident in “A Guide for Preparing Annual Police
Reports,” published by the IACP’s Committee on Uniform Crime Records in 1929. It divided
criminal statistics into two categories, the first “which are considered essential for any police
325
report” and the second “of a less essential nature but which may be presented when available.”
The first category included facts such as the numbers of police personnel and salaries, crimes
committed, crimes reported, and properties lost, stolen and recovered. Auto thefts and recoveries
326
merited its own table. Significantly, also included among “essential facts” were the “sex, age,
327
color, and nativity” of persons charged with crimes.
The second category of “additional facts” contained more specific information, such as
comparative crime rates (the Guide helpfully included formulas to calculate rates and
percentages), dispositions of arrests and trials, and traffic violations. The IACP -- which had
become an enforcer of the Bureau’s informational primacy -- also wanted to know the numbers
of fingerprints and photographs that departments sent to the DOJ to determine “the extent to
328
which the police are participating in nation-wide identification efforts.”
As Professor Pamela Sankar explains, “Stopping something before it happens requires a
certain kind of knowledge about the class of events to be stopped—from crop blights, to traffic
accidents, to crimes. The knowledge must be intimate and grounded, yet generalizable enough to
sustain accurate predictions.”329 Compiling information on criminal elements—from names to
personal backgrounds to criminal records—and centralizing that information in one place would
allow officials to construct profiles of “dangerous individuals” who warranted surveillance and
to ascertain patterns and trends in criminal behavior.
As with Dyer Act cases and fingerprint collection, the Bureau’s collaborative collection
of criminal statistics served the interests of feds and locals alike. Hoover called the Identification
330
and Information Division a “Library of Cooperation” with the Bureau “only its custodian.” In
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Appropriations Bill for 1928, Sixty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, December 1926-January 1927, p.
58 (testimony of Hoover).
323

Uniform Crime Reports 1, no. 1 (August 1930), p.1.

324

Id.

325
A Guide for Preparing Annual Police Reports, by Committee on Uniform Crime Records, IACP (New
York, rev. 1929), 7 [hereinafter “Guide”].
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Id. at 21.
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Id. at 18.

328

Id. at 34.
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Sankar diss., 134.
1934 Conf. Procs. at 14-15, 29.
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contrast to fingerprints, for which the Bureau had to do some quality control and education,331
police departments remained the sole authors of their own numbers, with the Bureau simply
publishing, not second-guessing.332 The Wickersham Commission would worry about the
Bureau’s release of graphic charts of “monthly crime trends,” accompanied by press statements
“quoting and interpreting them without qualification”—notwithstanding the many “weaknesses”
in the Bureau’s numbers.333 And with collection and publication responsibilities came the
opportunity for the Bureau to shape public perceptions and crime policy, an opportunity Hoover
regularly seized in appropriations hearings.334 Although the commission hoped that the Bureau’s
role would be temporary, locals’ support for the Bureau ensured that its hope for “the ultimate
plan” that didn’t involve the Bureau would never materialize.335 This service continues today as
the Uniform Crime Reporting system.336
The Identification and Information Division and Dyer Act prosecutions were not the only
pieces of informational infrastructure that the Bureau provided. Other important pieces included
the FBI Laboratory, which started in 1932 and provided forensic assistance to departments
337
throughout the country. Here again, service and control ran together. Although Hoover
initially welcomed the creation of state and local labs and allowed Bureau experts to offer
corroborating testimony in important cases, that practice ended in 1941: Bureau experts would
no longer testify on matters in which others had testified.338 Indeed the Bureau’s anticompetitive
tactics allegedly went further. According to former assistant director William Sullivan, the
Bureau
maintained a blacklist of police departments euphemistically called the
‘Restricted List.’ A law enforcement agency placed on the Restricted
331
See, e.g, FBI, The Science of Fingerprints: Classification and Uses 1 (1985) (publication educating
departments on fingerprinting notes need for fingerprint cards to be “clear and distinct”).
332
Michael D. Maltz, Crime Statistics: A Historical Perspective, 23 Crime & Delinquency 32, 39 (1977)
(“Only when the submission of a police department is greatly at variance with the expected crime rates does the FBI
refuse to publish the jurisdiction’s data”).
333
Report on Criminal Statistics, 10; see also Lowenthal, 395.
334
Appropriations Bill for 1932, Seventy-First Congress, Third Session, December 1930 (Hoover). Hoover
also used the Uniform Crime Reports to justify the staff increase to form the Research Unit of the Crime Records
Division, which functioned as a public relations office for the Bureau. See Powers, 157-158.
335
Report on Criminal Statistics, 17.
336
See https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis
337
Hoover would later boast:

all a law enforcement agency need do is invest in the price of a postage stamp, and it
has available the entire resources, talents and experience of the FBI Laboratory. A
small sheriff's office or police department -not financially able to maintain a criminal
laboratory-has at its disposal the latest developments of science. Surely, this is a
wondrous accomplishment-an accomplishment which occurs not occasionally, but
many times every day.
John Edgar Hoover, Cooperation: The Key to Effective Law Enforcement in America, 12 Syr. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1960).
Duayne Joseph Dillon, A History of Criminalistics in the United States, 1850-1950, D.Crim.
dissertation, U. Cal Berkeley, 1977 at 179-80.
338
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List may find itself completely cut off from the services of the FBI Lab.
The quickest and surest way for a local department to be placed on the
Restricted list was to criticize the efficiency of the FBI or to encourage
the establishment of independent regional labs. The list still existed in
339
1976.
Just as the Bureau had once eliminated competing fingerprint registries by acquiring the IACP’s
and Leavenworth’s databases, so too would it further cement its position within the criminal
enforcement ecosystem by turning its labs into an “essential facility”340 that it used even more
strategically.
In 1935, the Bureau also added the National Academy to train police officers and, in the
process, create a cadre of willing collaborators in Bureau operations and the nationwide
informational network. During his 1937 appropriations testimony, Hoover noted that the
Academy “remove[d] the argument for the establishment of a national police force” because it
“bridge[d] over that gap between local and Federal law-enforcement officers” by “eliminat[ing]
341
the jealousies that sometimes exist and help[ing] to do away with friction with may develop.”
By 1940, he would proclaim the Academy the “West Point of Law Enforcement” and its
graduates a “‘reserve force’ that could ‘be mustered into the service of the FBI.’”342
Hoover made sure that the American public, and not just the local police, understood the
Bureau’s role. He allowed Universal Pictures to shoot a short documentary about the FBI, titled
343
You Can’t Get Away With It, showcasing the agency’s work. Released in 1936, the film
explained how violations of the Dyer Act “put the G-men” on the trail of notorious criminals. It
recorded the Identification Division’s cache of fingerprints and system of matching them to
suspects, as well as the Crime Lab where experts analyzed fingerprints, handwriting, and bullet
patterns; created moulage impressions to compare teeth marks, footprints, and other body parts;
and used newfangled scientific tools so that “there was no crime that cannot be solved.” The
documentary even showed agents practicing their marksmanship at the Academy. You Can’t Get
Away With It closed with Hoover looking straight into the camera, declaring that the FBI
“belongs to you.” The piece beautifully captures both strands of the Bureau’s strategy: An
avowal of service, deeply rooted in its relationships with state and local authorities, and an
implicit (barely) declaration of professional superiority and centrality to crime-fighting
throughout the nation.
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William C. Sullivan, The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover’s FBI 98 (1970).

Thomas F. Cotter, The Essential Facilities Doctrine. Antitrust Law and Economics, (Keith N. Hylton, et
al. eds., 2008).
341
Appropriations Bill for 1937, Seventy-Fifth Congress, First Session, January 1937, at 81-82.
340

342
Maria Ponomarenko, at 177 (quoting J. Edgar Hoover, "M-Day for the FBI," The Atlanta Constitution,
August 11, 1940, p. B4).
343
Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ni2SP6GAA1o&feature=youtu.be.
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C. Into the Postwar Period
In the 1940s, war responsibilities took center stage at the Bureau, which leveraged its
344
relationships with local departments and private organizations into the national security arena.
As Maria Ponomarenko notes, local or state police handled as many as 30 percent of all “national
345
defense” cases between October 1940 and October 1942. (Such a high degree of leverage in
346
national security policing continues to this day. ) This added reliance on locals during wartime
explains why the Bureau did not pause its work on Dyer Act cases; more than ever, it needed to
keep cultivating the relationship of mutual benefit. And, in fact, Hoover continued to feature
347
Dyer Act recovery figures as justification for the Bureau’s appropriations. In a 1942
appropriations hearing, he noted a “slight decline” in convictions—from 2,340 in 1941 to 2,282
348
in 1942. Another drop, the following year, was attributed to the “fact that there are not so
many automobiles for sale, but principally and probably because of gasoline rationing and the
349
difficulty of getting tires.” As the war ended, Hoover noted that auto thefts were starting to
350
spike.
Postwar and into the 1960s, the Bureau ramped up its internal security operations and
351
belatedly began to focus on organized crime and civil rights violations. Even amid these
forays, however, Dyer Act cases (along with bank robberies and fugitive apprehensions)
continued to provide a ground bass—a steady source of statistics justifying appropriations for
352
legislators skeptical of the Bureau’s other work. In 1946, when Hoover asked for an additional
344
1947 Approps Hrgs (1946). See Theoharis & Cox, The Boss at 193 (recounting establishment of
“contact programs” with the American Legion, and collaborative relations with other associations).
345

MP at 180.

346
See Richman, The Right Fight; Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of
Terror, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 289 (2012).
347

In 1941, when Sen Norris criticizes the Bureau for arresting members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade,
one Representative responded that “when the FBI returns almost $8 for every dollar it spends, through collection of
fines and the restoration of property, we, as Members of Congress, should think carefully before we hastily criticize
such a great law-enforcement agency of the Federal Government.”) Congressional Record v. 86, 76th. Cong., 3rd.
Sess.: 3 January 1940-3 January 1941, at 2443. (Stockham at 159).
348
Hearing for Appropriations Bill for 1943, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session, January 1942 at
118-119 (also noting that were Congress to enact a proposal to make “the theft of automobile tires a Federal
offense” the Bureau would need “additional funds”).

Hearings for Appropriations Bill for 1945, Seventy-Eighth Congress, First Session, December 1943
[295] (testimony of Director of the Bureau of Prison).
349

350
Hearings for Appropriations Bill for 1947, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session, January 1946 at
155 (noting uptick in auto thefts after war. Crime wave; 27% more automobile thefts between November 1944 and
November 1945. 74% increase in auto theft violations from October 1940 to January 1946. 62% of car thefts
committed by persons under age 21.).
351

See, e.g. Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1965-66, at 345-63.

352
See Hearings on Appropriations Bill for 1955, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session, December 1953
[167-168] (testifying at a 1953 appropriations hearing, Hoover noted, “[d]uring the past year 13,886 stolen
automobiles were recovered in cases investigated by the Bureau, an all-time high,” and called auto theft “one of the
most aggravated criminal problems we are faced with in this country”).
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3,000 agents, he noted that each agent was currently handling an average of 19.09 cases and
reported that Dyer Act cases (among others) were bound to increase. This same year, Hoover
expressed his concern to Attorney General Tom Clark—who had recently ordered the Bureau to
investigate the lynching of four African Americans in Monroe, Georgia, by a mob of
twenty—that a massive effort of enough agents “to operate a middle-sized field office” had not
found the official involvement that would support a federal prosecution and had come at the
353
expense of a rising number of “delinquent cases.”
354

In the late 1960s, the Bureau began to pull back. The turning point, however, came in
1970, when the Justice Department issued guidelines that limited Dyer Act prosecutions to
“organized crime ring cases and multitheft operations unless exceptional circumstances are
involved. Under the guidelines, individual theft cases are ordinarily not to be federally
355
prosecuted.” Suddenly, even as the number of reported motor vehicle cases climbed, Dyer Act
filings dropped from 4,090 cases (10.7% of all filed) in 1970 to 2,408 cases (5.8% of all cases
356
filed) in 1971.
But the Bureau did not give up this line of business easily. In 1969, Tom Wicker
observed that even if it was local police, not FBI agents, that chased down stolen cars that
crossed state lines, the Bureau still “[took] the recovered automobiles, add[ed] their value to its
statistics, prosecute[d] the thief if possible, and count[ed] him as another arrest and conviction.”
357
James Q. Wilson later noted the same pattern: agents “would call up local police departments
in search of recovered cars, which, if it could be shown they had come from out of state were
358
listed as ‘FBI recoveries.’”

353

Elliff, at 231-32.

354
Perhaps the Bureau was showing some selectively in the early 1960s. See Car Thief Is Riding High,
Hartford Courant, Jan 13, 1963, at 4G (noting that the FBI was “mainly concerned with criminals using stolen cars
in their crimes, and also with the big professional theft rings. Local and state police handle intra-state car theft.”).
But see Report of the Attorney General for 1965-66, at 356 (explaining number of stolen car investigations in part
by noting “widespread use of these vehicles in the commission of other crimes”).
355

Gov’t Acct. Office, U.S. Attorneys Do Not Prosecute many Suspected Violators of Federal Laws.
GGD-77-86, at 15; see Wilson at 30 (noting DOJ directive ““not to prosecute interstate auto-theft cases where the
guilty person was under the age of twenty-one and not a serious recidivist or over the age of twenty-one and not
previously convicted of a felony, unless the car was one of several cars stolen by a ‘car ring,’ was stripped or
demolished, or was used to commit a separate felony”); see also U.S. Plans to Curtail Federal Charges of
Automobile Theft, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1970, at 20 (noting that one of every eight cases files in Fed cts involves
Dyer Act and 20 percent of all of Fed prison inmates sentenced under Dyer Act).
356

GAO report, at 15.

357

Tom Wicker, What Have They Done Since They Shot Dillinger?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1969, at SM4;
see also Louis M. Kohlmeier, Hoover Loses Immunity to Criticism Despite “Law-and-Order” Mood, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 10, 1968, at 1 (noting that “[s]ome crime experts question the significance” of Hoover oft-touted statistics about
recoveries and fugitives located, since “[l]ocal police often help capture fugitives and recover cars”).
358
James Q. Wilson, Investigators at 98; see also Fred Cook at 209 (noting that the stolen cars for which the
Bureau took credit were generally found by local police and that even when investigating car theft rings, the Bureau
was assisted not just by local police but by “detectives of private agencies like the National Board of Fire
Underwriters, which represents the insurance industry”).
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The response of the U.S Attorney’s Offices that prosecuted Dyer Act cases varied. In his
extraordinary field study of those offices, James Eisenstein found some U.S. Attorneys scoffing
at all but prosecutions of interstate rings. As one prosecutor put it, the Bureau’s “interest is
359
statistics,” and “that’s such a trivial thing.” In some districts, judges pressured U.S. Attorneys
not to pursue “junk” theft cases. But agents often pressured prosecutors to take even routine
cases, and they often succeeded in part because U.S. Attorneys were willing to accommodate a
360
field office.
There was a final moment of clarity (or farce) in 1972, during Hoover’s last appearance
before a House Appropriations subcommittee (shortly before his death). Referring to recent
361
allegations that the Bureau used Dyer Act statistics to sway appropriators, Chairman John
Rooney (a close ally) noted:
We know when a car is recovered that at least six agencies participate in
the credit for it, and when it comes to fines and recoveries we know that
there are at least five agencies which participate in the credit for that.
There is nothing wrong with that. We were never hoodwinked by
anything done here, I assure you, because I think all the Members of this
362
Committee are a bit hardboiled.
After Hoover’s death, his successor, L. Patrick Gray, “wean[ed] the F.B.I. from its
concentration on [Dyer Act cases], an investigative field that some say Mr. Hoover used to fatten
363
arrest statistics.” In 1975, the next Bureau director Clarence Kelly (responsible for giving
James Q. Wilson access to the Bureau) established a broad “Quality over Quantity” program
“designed to downplay statistics for their own sake in favor of more thoughtful priority setting in
364
each field office.” According to Wilson, this had an immediate effect on Dyer Act cases.
“When an out-of-state stolen automobile is recovered by a local police department,” Wilson
explained, “the Bureau no longer adds the vehicle to its caseload unless it appears to be the work
365
of a criminal ‘ring’ or unless there is a known subject who is a repeat offender.” And he noted
359

Eisenstein, supra at 169.

360

James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the Political and Legal Systems 105
(1978); see Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749,
769-773 (2003) (exploring how agencies can leverage their investigative authority to influence prosecutorial
priorities).
361
See also William C. Sullivan, The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover’s FBI 118 (1970) (“What the
senators never knew was that most (if not all) of the real work involved in investigating the kinds of crimes that
made for Hoover’s blockbuster statistics, juvenile car theft and the like, was done by the local police, not the FBI.”).
362

Wilson, at 173, quoting House Appropriations Subcommittee, Departments of State, Justice et al, 92nd
Cong., 2d sess., 1972, pp. 54-55, 73; see Kohlmeier, supra (noting Rooney’s “close” ties to Hoover).
363

Christopher Lydon, Whoever Runs It, F.B.I. Faces Problem of Political Control, Mar. 26, 1973, at 30.

364

Wilson at 131.

365
Wilson at 132. For an example of a program, fostered by the Bureau and the National Auto Theft
Bureau, that promoted state-based auto theft efforts, see James S. McKinnon, Cooperation--Key to Florida Auto
Theft Intelligence Unit’s Success, 47 FBI Law Enf. Bull. no. 89 at 12 (August, 1978) (describing program
“conceived” at 1972 meeting of the Intl. Assn. of Auto Theft Investigators).

54

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415103

that the program “was welcomed by agents for the relief it offered from carrying trivial cases for
statistical reasons, but since these cases had rarely been investigated seriously, no real changes in
366
agent behavior occurred.” The Bureau’s pullback was also a function of pressure exerted by
the Executive Office of US Attorneys on federal prosecutors around the country to downgrade
“non-ring” cases. The readiness of that office to monitor Dyer Act activity was, Eisenstein
reports, the main reason why Dyer Act cases plummeted from 12.7 percent of all criminal
367
terminations in 1970 to 4.3 percent in 1975.
Even as it cut back on Dyer Act cases, bank robbery cases gave the Bureau a similar
368
vehicle for service, albeit to a lesser extent. In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration called
for the agency to leave most bank robberies to local authorities in an effort to re-center the
369
Bureau on investigations where it truly had a comparative advantage, like white collar cases.
But the Bureau largely resisted. Echoing the Dyer Act story, the role such service cases played in
nurturing the Bureau’s relationships with local enforcers and their congressional allies and
370
commercial interests ensured that bank robberies would be an FBI concern until 9/11.
IV.

Conclusion / Theoretical Implications

The foregoing narrative tells how the new mobility of the automotive age catalyzed the
development of the FBI from bureaucratic appendage to federal centerpiece of a policing
network. By collecting and disseminating criminal information through the Identification
Division and by processing criminal information as Dyer Act (and, after 1934, Fugitive Felon)
prosecutions, the Bureau made a place for itself in the “twilight” areas that lay beyond the reach
of local departments. In the process, the Bureau transformed the “assemblage” of mostly local

366

Wilson at 158.

367

Eisenstein, at 106.

368

James Q. Wilson, The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents 27 (1978) (“When a bank is
robbed, the FBI responds immediately…. The FBI must apprehend the suspects in these cases just as if they were
local police officers, but often the charging and prosecution of these cases is turned over to the local police who will
also be on the scene.”).
369

Bank Robbery: The Federal Law Enforcement Role Should Be Reduced. GGD-78-87; B-179296.

370

Philip Taubman, F.B.I. Role Dispute in Administration, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1979, at A28 (noting that
while Carter Administration was pushing the Bureau to “turn bank robbery investigations over to local law
enforcement agencies,” “with bank robberies occurring at a record rate and the number of convictions for the crime
declining, powerful forces in Congress and the banking industry are opposed to the sudden reduction of FBI
involvement.”). The banking industry had always been a big booster of the Bureau’s bank robbery work. See Dept.
of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1941, Hrgs. Subcom. of Comm. on Appropriations, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 148
(1940) (Hoover brings letters from the American Bankers Assn. and an Oklahoma bank organization telling “how
they have been able to reduce insurance rates by reason of the effectiveness of agents of the F.B.I.”).
The Bureau’s bank robbery work had (understandably) always generated strong support from the banking
industry. Dept. of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1941, Hrgs. Subcom. of Comm. on Appropriations, 66th Cong., 3d
Sess. 148 (1940) (Hoover brings letters from the American Bankers Assn. and an Oklahoma bank organization
telling “how they have been able to reduce insurance rates by reason of the effectiveness of agents of the F.B.I.”).
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371

police departments into a national policing network. Yet the very means by which the Bureau
emerged as an indispensable player in that network and as a renowned protagonist in its own
right had implications for both the Bureau’s autonomy and criminal justice federalism.
A. Autonomy
The means by which the Bureau achieved its network role would be familiar to tech
entrepreneurs today: it established a criminal information platform, not just through its
Identification Division and Laboratory, but also through Dyer Act cases. As Lina Kahn has
powerfully argued with respect to Amazon, a firm controlling a platform can leverage its
privileged access to information to gain a competitive advantage when it also pursues the same
372
sorts of business opportunities as its platform users. Yet unlike the Amazon story, there was
little risk that the Bureau would deploy the increasing broad jurisdictional grants entailed by new
criminal statutes to massively encroach on local police turf. To be sure, the Bureau would
regularly draw on, and further burnish, its national status by making Big Cases on the backs of
the locals. Its hand would soon be strengthened by its domestic security role. At the outbreak of
World War II, President Roosevelt issued an order—drafted by Hoover after hearing that the
New York Police Department intended to create a substantial “special sabotage
squad”—authorizing the Bureau “to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to
espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.” The order directed local police
373
to “promptly turn over” to the Bureau any information relating to these matters. Yet
notwithstanding the new statutes that ostensibly allowed it to do so, the Bureau’s size and
structure precluded significant displacement of local criminal authority, and the Bureau showed
no inclination in pursuing that goal.
How does this story fit within the frequent claims of the Bureau’s “autonomy,”
particularly under J. Edgar Hoover? Partly because his focus is on the extent to which agencies
can escape congressional and presidential control, Daniel Carpenter speaks of “autonomy” as
374
occurring when politicians given an agency “free rein in program building.” James Q. Wilson
similarly suggests that bureaucratic autonomy can, in part, be measured by an agency’s ability to
375
avoid unwanted functions. Yet even when it came to domestic intelligence collection far
removed from its criminal work, the Bureau’s autonomy in Hoover’s heyday is difficult to
discern. Hoover may have used his secret files to gain sway over several presidential

371
Patrick Joyce, The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State Since 1800 ch 1 at 19 ( 2013)
(describing network as “held together (sometimes very uncertainly) at particular key sites or nodes and through the
actions of key actors and processes, human and non-human”).
372

Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710, 783 (2017); see also Kenneth A.
Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1051, 1087 (2017) (on risk that a
platform will “leverag[e] its market position unfairly to establish a dominant position in other markets”).
373

Theoharis & Cox, at 179-80.

374

Daniel Carpenter: The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, at 4.

375
James Q Wilson, Bureaucracy 108 (1989); see Brian A. Ellison, A Conceptual Framework for
Analyzing Bureaucratic Politics and Autonomy, 25 Am. Rev. Pub. Admin. 168 (1995).
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376

377

administrations, but he was also spectacularly responsive to his political masters. And in the
criminal area, as we have seen, it is a strange autonomy that would find an agency yoked to a
regular grind of service cases that relieve the obligations of others.
Carpenter suggests that “multiple networks” promote autonomy by reducing dependence
on any one group, “putting the agency in the role of broker among numerous interests seeking
378
access to the state.” But a Carpenter-like story of autonomy-forging can easily overlook the
“agency” of the counterparties to the Bureau’s alliances—the states, localities, and associations
379
that comprised its “multiple and diverse” “network affiliations.” When the Bureau set aside a
large proportion of its docket to service cases, was it harnessing the power of policing and
commercial interests for its own ends or becoming a tool of them? When it comes to Congress,
which surely was also responding to those same interests, the observational equivalence problem
is even greater: The Bureau clearly thought Congress wanted regular updates on its car theft
work and cooperation with local authorities. Did what started as a weak agency’s commitment to
building support through service turn, by the 1960s, into a strong agency’s anachronistic desire
to throw a statistical sop to Congress? Did the Dyer Act line of business turn over time into a
380
well-internalized burden? A sign of bureaucratic lethargy? We doubt these questions can be
answered, and appreciating how the Bureau’s associational alliances sustained its criminal work
well beyond its first half century does not require answering them.
A more nuanced notion of “autonomy” is particularly appropriate when thinking about
the Bureau. As a normative matter, vague talk of “autonomy” tells us little about how to balance
political accountability—which remains critical for an agency that lives in the shadow of
376

Powers; Theoharis & Cox; others.

377

See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington & Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in American Institutional
Development. 1 Perspective on Politics 495, 504-05 (2003) (on Hoover’s responsiveness to presidential demands);
Christopher John Gerard, “A Program of Cooperation”: The FBI, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and
the Communist Issue, 1950-1956, at 393 (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1993) (noting how Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee spurred Bureau’s security investigations during Truman and Eisenhower
administrations and how “[s]ucessive attorneys general approved and sustained the FBI-SISS relationship [] for
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The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition 395-401; 407-18 (1988) (on Hoover’s
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Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee Report), book II, at 225 (1976)
(on “political abuse of intelligence information”).
378
Carpenter at 363; see also Ellison, supra at 173 (“The greater an agency’s willingness to work with other
governmental actors, the more likely the agency will maintain its autonomy.”)
379

Carpenter at 32.

380

In 1970, a former agent noted:
Patterns develop. Consequently agent man-power continues to be focused on stolen car
cases, on “petty” thefts, and on bank robberies (etc), because these types of crime have
produced high statistical success in the past. Sameness sets in. Read the Appropriations
for 1971, and it will seem like a carbon copy of Appropriations for 1970.

Letter of Jack Shaw to Prof. Abram F. Blumburg, Sept, 15, 1970, in Cong Rec. Feb. 1, 1971, at S1197, 1199
(reprinted at behest of Sen. George McGovern, after Hoover retaliated against letter writer).
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Hoover—with insulation from partisan or personal agendas. And as a positive matter, the
Bureau’s history and its operational realities demand that sweeping discussions of
“independence” fully take these associational alliances into account.
Yet Carpenter is surely right that strength can flow from dependence. With the agenda
constraints and resource obligations of the Bureau’s service work came the support of those it
served. Maximal interaction with state and local enforcers—not simply drawing on their
informational networks for assistance in national security, organized crime, and other “big”
cases, but evening the balance with collaboration on more local projects—has long been a key to
381
the Bureau’s status within the national ecosystem and within the federal government.
One therefore might worry about the durability of the alliances explored here. In the
wake of 9/11, the Bureau, lacking the resources to surge its counterterrorism programs without
retreating elsewhere, significantly “reduced its investigative effort in traditional crime matters,”
leaving state and local agencies to handle most bank robberies, even though they exceeded the
382
investigative capabilities of “a few.” Some argued that its new priorities meant the Bureau was
“no longer the appropriate institutional home for the UCR.”383 Moreover, while direct federal
grants to states that Hoover opposed back in 1934 have become a staple of state budgets (even as
the level of government they go to, state vs. local, has long been a matter of political
384
contestation), they scarcely strengthen the Bureau’s hand, as control lies elsewhere. The
Bureau’s retreat in recent years from the “service work” of Dyer Act cases and bank robberies
may come at the cost of police support, and the support of legislators protective of police
interests. Sure, the locals continue to get substantial assistance from the Bureau in the form of
cases taken on for special federal investment—perhaps targeting local corruption, perhaps
violent gangs—and support from the Identification Division and the FBI Laboratories. But the
perceived balance of payments perhaps isn’t what it was in the old days.
385

Broad strategic initiatives in recent years -- designed to take full advantage of the
Bureau’s unique capabilities -- may lead to an unintended weakening in the political support that
has long sustained the agency. This is not necessarily an argument for returning to Dyer Act
cases or their contemporary equivalents—violent crime, small-scale cybercrime—but for an
awareness of the costs of jettisoning them. Outside of protecting the country against international
terrorist attacks (and particularly with the domestic terror threat looming increasingly large), the
381
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Bureau’s responsibilities remain in flux and thought should be given to the relationship between
what it does and what it is—from where it gets the support it needs. Perhaps some day private
information platforms and aggregators will replace local police as the Bureau’s principal source
386
of operational sustenance and potential support (or resistance). But enough speculating.
Our analysis also suggests a more general relationship between structure and function in
the context of any regulatory or enforcement project that requires the acquisition of information
387
and the processing of it—or when thinking about the State, writ large. The arrow between
institutional architecture and informational acquisition runs both ways, with the resulting flow of
information shaping the regulatory processing and output. As we have seen, in the federal
388
criminal enforcement context, the extent to which an agency outsources information gathering
gives external entities the power to shape agency docket. This story of non-federal entities
shaping federal priorities because federal agencies rely on them for information can’t possibly be
unique to the criminal enforcement space. And though we leave the work for others, we presume
that this framework would shed far more light on “operational federalism”—how our system of
“compound government” actually works—than static stories of formal relationships between
federal and non-federal entities that fill the literature.
B. Horizontal Federalism
Our story of how the Bureau grew and managed its policing network also helps explain
the criminal justice localism that continues to this day. States provide penal law and prisons, but
counties and municipalities decide who gets prosecuted for what, how defendants are treated,
and how police and prosecutors interact with the communities they serve. Notwithstanding
progressive impulses toward centralization and the challenges of the new (auto)mobility, police
and national leaders responded to the problem of interstate coordination not with conditional
grants in aid to the states or with material support to build a horizontal infrastructure of
state-to-state collaborations, but with federal criminal laws and a federal infrastructure. These
particular solutions to the interstate coordination problem relied on—and strengthened—the
authority of local police departments, for they were able directly to negotiate their relationships
with the feds from a position of informational strength.
Our story also suggests that whether or not a formal “anti-commandeering” principle
mediates the relationship between the federal government and state and local police departments,
and whether or not the Rehnquist Court created that doctrine in New York v. United States and
389
Prinz v. United States o ut of whole cloth, are really beside the point. The organization of
criminal enforcement authority and resources in the United States has always guaranteed the
386
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principle. Cops don’t work for free, and neither do their departments. To be sure, local
390
departments will occasionally balk at discrete and controversial policies like gun control and
391
immigration.  But when it comes to the “normal,” broader law enforcement portfolio, the feds
always had to be sensitive to local “autonomy” to ensure mutual benefits. In this broader context,
recruitment has always been open to negotiation, and information gathered for exchange.
Certainly, more recent developments have changed the balance of power in the criminal
392
justice space. Elizabeth Hinton’s recent book, for instance, highlights the extent of federal
grant activity (even though her focus on federal sources leads her to give short shrift to the
393
agency of cities and states in setting their own criminal justice policies). The federal
informational infrastructure continues to loom large in criminal enforcement efforts, but
statewide and local databases are becoming increasingly important, especially as states are
engaging in information sharing. Particularly noteworthy is the growth of state and local DNA
databases that are not governed by the strict restrictions of the CODIS system controlled by the
394
FBI. Moreover, a road not taken in the 1930s—federal support for state-based criminal
databases—was to some extent taken in the wake of 9/11 in form of intelligence fusion centers
395
established around the country.
390
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Even so, governors and other statewide actors still generally lack the authority over
policing and prosecutors that they lacked in the 1930s—a fact that police-involved shootings and
396
police abuses regularly bring into sharp focus. Recent work has highlighted how we need to
look to “local contexts” and “the diffusion of punitive approaches from local terrains to states
397
and regions” to understand “changes in penal practice and imprisonment.” Although the
“Gubernatorial Administration” that Miriam Siefter notices across many policy spaces has also
398
reached into wholesale penal issues like prison construction and decriminalization, it rarely
399
extends directly to criminal enforcement operations. As we have noted, the criminal justice
project’s focus on violence and property crime (as is generally true in the United States) and the
informational needs inherent in such a focus will inevitably push authority down to the county
(even precinct) level. This reality has long been reinforced by the celebration of the local as the
situs of criminal justice, where the main actors—police, prosecutors, courts, juries, and citizens
of the vicinage—are found.
Moreover, federal crime creation remains the default solution to interstate enforcement
400
coordination inadequacies. One need only look at recent efforts to address the interstate
problem of “deadbeat dads”—parents in child support arrears but residing outside the jurisdiction
of state recovery efforts. The statutory solution was the 1992 Child Support Recovery Act, which
created a new federal crime. In 1998, when the misdemeanor status of the offense was deemed
insufficient to punish the deadbeat and incentivize enforcers, Congress bumped it up to a felony.
401
Unlike auto thefts, these cases didn’t fill the federal docket, but the nature of the response has
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continuities with the Dyer Act. And it highlights the lasting effects of a process that, while
402
building federal capacity, relieved states from having to fashion adequate coordination
strategies and retarded the extension of even a modicum of state control over local police
403
departments.
The story of how the FBI helped shape the US policing network and was itself shaped by
that network is, in the end, a story about our government and ourselves. Joyce and Mukerji
powerfully suggest that we should see “the state not as a thing but as a shape-shifting assemblage
of people and things.” Far from being a unitary actor, they explain, it “is at heart a
communication complex and territorial entity, one that keeps reweaving the fabric of government
404
with changing lines of communication and different ways of managing problems of distance.”
If one seeks to find the Bureau’s place in the American state, one needs to look within this fabric,
not plumb imagined depths.
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